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I. Introduction
By including a discussion of the federal securities laws in this Symposium on
The Role of Professionals in Corporate Governance, the editors of The Notre Dame
Lawyer have recognized the importance of the interaction between investor pro-
tection and corporate governance. The broad objective of the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act)' and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)
2
is to protect investors by preserving honesty and fair dealing in our capital mar-
kets. To achieve this end, the Acts require corporations relying on external
financing or exceeding a specified size to disclose the material aspects of their
financial affairs 3 -a basic requirement that Congress fully expected would im-
prove corporate conduct 4 and business practices.5
Professionals bear heavy responsibilities which help assure full and fair dis-
closure of material corporate financial information. Commentators have dis-
cussed the role accountants6 and lawyers7 perform in protecting investors. Not as
much scholarly attention has been devoted to another professional group-in-
vestment bankersS--although their effective performance as underwriters also is
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
3 See 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
4 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933): "This phase of the law will have a direct tendency
to preclude persons from acting as nominal directors while shirking their duty to know and guide the
affairs of the corporation."
5 See Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act (pt. 2), FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55:
By compelling full publicity . . . so that the public may have an opportunity to understand
what it buys, the [Securities] Act seeks to promote standards of competence and candor in
dealing with the public. It deliberately aims against dormant high-pressure techniques which
have in the past so tragically submerged the investment banker's traditional responsibility for
disinterested financial advice.
6 See, e.g., Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, Corporate Responsibility in the Financial Ac-
counting and Disclosure Areas: Who Makes and Who Implements the Rules,', 34 BUs. LAW. 1979 (1979); Earle, The
Fairness Myth, 28 VAND. L. REV. 147 (1975); Gruenbaum & Steinberg, Accountants'Liability and Responsibil-
ity." Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Lo'. L.A.L. REV. 247 (1980); Margolis, Sanctions Against Account-
ants For Violations of the Securities Laws.- A Reappraisal, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 399 (1979).
7 See, e.g., In re William R. Carter and Charlesj. Johnson, Jr., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release
No. 17,597 (Feb. 28, 1981) [1981 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847; Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Report by Special Committee on Lawyers' Role in Securities Transactions, 33 Bus.
LAW. 1343 (Mar. 1978); Ferrara & Steinberg, The Role of Inside Counsel ik the Corporate Accountability Process, 4
CORP. L. REv. 3 (1981); Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligatons." A Response to Professor
Kramer, 68 GEO. L. J. 191 (1979); Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adniser, the Public Interest, and Professional
Ethics, 76 MICH. L. REV. 423 (1978); Patterson, The Limits of the Lawyer's Diseretion and the Law of Legal
Ethics: National Student Marketing Revisited, 1979 DUKE L. J. 1251; Williams, Corporate Accountabiliy and
the Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAW. 7 (1978).
8 For purposes of this article, the term investment banker means an entity engaged in business as an
[June 19811
INVESTMENT BANKERS
critical to achieving the purposes of the federal securities laws. While it is true
that the untoward conduct of some investment bankers during the rampant spec-
ulation of the 1920's brought discredit upon the entire banking industry, it is also
true that the care and competence displayed by investment bankers since enact-
ment of the federal securities laws have contributed uniquely to the aura of confi-
dence surrounding public securities offerings of the 1980's. 9
The work of investment bankers and other securities professionals has been
all the more challenging because of the multilayered regulatory framework
within which they function. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act have
spawned two different sets of disclosure requirements applicable to many of the
same companies.10 Because of the lack of optional coordination between the two
statutes' disclosure provisions and the extent to which the securities markets and
business practices have evolved since 1933, the Commission has initiated a com-
prehensive program to integrate, streamline and make uniform the Acts' disclo-
sure requirements. However, even if the information required is the same under
both Acts so that disclosure under one satisfies the requirements of the other,
there will remain important differences in liability treatment which may only be
resolved by legislation. As a result, the integration of periodic repqrts filed under
the Exchange Act into the more stringent liability provisions of section 11 of the
Securities Act has created some tension in the process of harmonizing the two
Acts by rulemaking.
The Securities Act and the Exchange Act utilize different standards for de-
termining civil liabilities for misstatements and omissions in the information fur-
nished to investors or made available to the markets. With respect to disclosures
under the Securities Act, those who distribute 1t or sell 12 the security are held to a
negligence standard under section 11. Thus underwriters, for example, are liable
for any misstatement or omission in a registration statement unless they can show
that after reasonable investigation they had reasonable ground to believe and did
underwriter or dealer, as those terms are defined in the Acts. See § 2(11) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77b(11) (1976).
9 Indeed, it has been observed that "[t]he 1933 act and the 1934 act, and the concepts embodied
therein, have become a basic part of the mores of business, and to a large extent the financial community is
self-policing." Halleran & Calderwood, Eect fFederal Regulation on Distn'ution c/and Trading in Securfties,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 86, 118 (1959).
10 With respect to issues of securities registered for public sale under the Securities Act, § 7 requires
disclosure in a registration statement filed with the Commission of 32 items of information set out in
Schedule A of the Act, as well as other information specified by the Commission. In addition, a prospectus
containing many of the items set forth in the registration statement must be delivered to each purchaser
together with any confirmation of sale. 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976). The Securities Act requires this disclosure
whenever an issuer, whatever its size, offers securities to the public, unless there is available an exemption
from the Act's registration provisions.
Section 12 of the Exchange Act requires any subject company registering a class of equity securities to
disclose information in 12 categories, as well as any other information the Commission deems to be neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976). Any
company with $1,000,000 or more of assets and at least 500 holders of record of a class of equity securities
must register that class under § 12. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1976). Companies subject-to the Exchange Act
also must periodically file additional information and documents that the Commission designates as neces-
sary to keep reasonably current the material filed pursuant to § 12. Exchange Act, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1976). Generally issuers of securities registered under § 12 of the Exchange Act are required, by §§ 13
and 15(d) of that Act, to file annual reports on Form 10-Qand reports of special developments on Form 8-
K.
11 Securities Act, § 1I(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
12 Id., § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
[Vol. 56:755]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
believe the statement was true. ' 3 For all practical purposes, however, those who
prepare and file periodic reports pursuant to the Exchange Act are probably
subject to liability only if the plaintiff sustains his burden of proving that the
defendant either knew the statement was false or misleading or acted with a reck-
less disregard for its truth or falsity.
Section 18 of the Exchange Act applies a negligence standard with respect to
all reports required to be filed. It provides that any person making a false or
misleading statement in a filing is liable to
any person (not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reli-
ance upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the per-
son sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such
statement was false or misleading. 
14
In the forty-seven years since the enactment of section 18, there has been no
reported case sustaining liability under the section, primarily because of the bur-
dens of proof placed on the plaintiff-burdens substantially different from those
imposed under section 11 of the Securities Act.1 5 Because of the limitations of
section 18, most plaintiffs suing with respect to false statements in periodic filings
now seek recovery under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and rule 10b-5
adopted thereunder.1 6 For a time it appeared that negligence might also be the
standard under rule 10b-5, but Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 17 and its progeny 8
have established that in every case the plaintiff must prove scienter.19 Thus, to-
day it is assumed that the standard with respect to periodic reports is that set
forth in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, if section 10(b) applies at all.
2 0
Although it may not be possible completely to reconcile the differences in
the liability standards of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the integrated
disclosure system which is now taking shape 21 should substantially reduce the
13 This reasonable investigation and belief standard is discussed in the text accompanying notes 69-72
and in section III. A. infira.
14 Exchange Act, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1976).
15 Under § 11, the plaintiff need not show reliance on the statement or that the price at which he
purchased the security was affected by the statement. Moreover, the defendant under § 18 need not show
that he conducted a reasonable investigation. Professor Loss has described § 18 as a "very much attenu-
ated § 11," 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1751 (2d ed. 1961).
16 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
17 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18 See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039
(1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977);
Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977).
19 Proof of scienter is also required in suits brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
20 Some defendants have argued that § 18 should be the exclusive remedy for misstatements or omis-
sions in periodic reports, on the grounds that to hold otherwise undermines the congressional intent and
could make defendants liable for massive damages to those who traded but did not rely. The courts have
generally rejected this contention. See Ross v. A. H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 946 (1980).
21 See Securities Act Release No. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980), [1981] 6 FED. SeC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,301,
announcing the adoption of amendments to annual report Form 10-K and related forms, rules, regulations
and guides; Securities Act Release No. 6232 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,647 (1980), announcing the
adoption of Form S-15 for the registration of securities issued in certain business combination transactions
and the adoption of related amendments to the proxy rules, the exhibits item of Regulation S-K, the
Commission's Rules of Practice, and the rule regarding incorporation by reference under the Securities
Act; Securities Act Release No. 6233 (Sept. 2, 1980), [1981] 6 FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 72,302, announc-
ing the adoption of a general revision of arts. 3 and 5 and related sections of art. 12 of Regulation S-X;
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regulatory burdens on publicly-held companies, particularly with respect to the
registration of new issues of securities. Under this system, certain publicly-held
companies selling securities under the Securities Act will be able to rely to a
considerable extent upon information previously filed pursuant to the Exchange
Act by incorporating that information by reference in the registration state-
ment.22 This procedure of incorporation by reference should eliminate a sub-
stantial amount of duplicate disclosure. It is anticipated that eventually all
companies will be classified based upon the extent to which, in the judgment of
the Commission, the securities markets have already absorbed previously fur-
nished company-specific information. Some companies widely followed by
financial analysts and actively traded by professional investors would be allowed
to satisfy the requirements of the Securities Act merely by incorporating by refer-
ence into their registration statement pertinent information from previously filed
periodic reports, updated in the prospectus 23 to reflect any changes. Lesser
known companies would be required to deliver the information so incorporated
to new purchasers but would have the option of furnishing the information in its
previously prepared form, updated in the prospectus, if necessary.
The effect of incorporation by reference is to subject the portions incorpo-
rated to the more stringent civil liability standards applicable to Securities Act
registration statements. Such a result may be of some concern to certain partici-
pants in the distribution process. While possible effects upon the professional
responsibilities of accountants and lawyers are expected to be minimal,24 the im-
Securities Act Release No. 6234 (Sept. 2, 1980), id., 72,303, announcing the establishment of uniform
instructions governing the periods to be covered by financial statements included in most registration and
reporting forms and in annual reports to shareholders furnished pursuant to the proxy rules; Securities Act
Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980), publishing for comment three proposed new
forms for the registration of offerings of securities; Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed.
Reg. 78 (1981), proposing for comment amendments to Regulation S-K.; and Securities Act Release No.
6288 (Feb. 9, 1981), [1981 Current Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,308, adopting amendments to
Form 10-Q.
22 The registration statement is the form issuers must file with the Commission in order to register the
securities to be offered to the public. A number of different forms of registration statements are currently
available to issuers. The major forms are Form S-1, the basic form for first time and general purpose
securities offerings; Form S-7, a short form of registration available to seasoned issuers meeting certain
financial and reporting conditions; Form S-8, used to register securities offered to employees pursuant to
certain types of employee benefit plans; Forms S-14 and S-15, used to register securities to be issued for
certain business combinations, reclassifications, and consolidations; Form S-16, a short form of registration
for qualified issuers in specified types of transactions; and Form S-18, an optional form of registration
available to small business issuers.
23 The prospectus is the portion of the registration statement which must be delivered to investors.
The Securities Act clearly contemplated that all information would be set out in the prospectus. However,
if a company's shares are actively traded and the market is efficient, any new offering will generally be at
no higher than the existing market price. That market price is not likely to be changed by the offering
(apart from market trends) unless new information about the company is disclosed. Of course, factors
extraneous to the issuer such as interest rates may affect price. The Commission, however, requires disclo-
sure of only company-specific information. Repetitive disclosure of old information is wasteful. See discus-
sion in section IV infra. Recognizing this, the Commission borrowed the cofncept of incorporation from
contract law so that the prospectus may satisfy the technical requirements of the Securities Act. Thus, the
missing disclosure is "incorporated" in the prospectus by reference to the necessary disclosure in Exchange
Act reports and is treated as if it were set out verbatim.
24 Lawyers are not one of the groups of persons expressly'made subject to the civil liability provisions
of § 11 of the Securities Act. If a lawyer is named in the registration statement as having rendered an
opinion concerning the validity of the securities when issued, there is a difference of opinion in the legal
community as to whether he would be an expert within the meaning of § 11. In the author's judgment,
the better view is that he should be.
Although accountants, as experts, are covered by § 11, the sequencing of their work is dictated by the
issuer's fiscal year and its need for other accounting services, and integration does not reduce the time
[Vol. 56:755)
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pact of integration upon investment bankers who underwrite equity or debt se-
curities offerings will be, in the view of many, profound. 25 Until now
underwriters have, to a large extent, controlled the process of preparing the regis-
tration statement for a planned securities offering and determined the most
favorable time to offer the securities publicly. Before and during the process of
preparation, underwriters have conducted the investigation contemplated by sec-
tion 11. Moreover, the process of preparation itself has provided an opportunity
for verification, as the meaning of particular sections of the prospectus is dis-
cussed and the implications of particular sentences are pondered. Officials of the
issuer also have worked with the underwriters to assemble the finished product
and to supply supplemental data verifying statements made.
Under an integrated system, however, information required by the registra-
tion statement may be furnished from different documents prepared at different
times by persons not associated with the underwriters. This can create several
problems for the underwriters. To the extent the existence of these documents
reduces the time needed to prepare the registration statement, the underwriters
may be less able to influence the timing of the offering. If the underwriters are
not comfortable with the disclosures in incorporated documents and wish to re-
vise or amplify the incorporated information, the issuer is likely to resist because
of the implication that the prior disclosures were inadequate. To the extent that
the Exchange Act's liability provisions are less stringent than those under the
Securities Act,26 the underwriters might understandably fear that not as much
care was given to preparing the incorporated documents as is given to preparing
a registration statement, especially since directors are not liable for mere negli-
gent omissions or misrepresentations in periodic reports.
2 7
In addition, if preparation time is reduced, much more of the underwriters'
investigation must occur not during preparation of the registration statement but
at some other time before it is filed, even though the document is in final form.
However, if the document is in final form the issuer will likely be impatient with
any filing delay resulting from the underwriters' desire to verify information.
Thus, while issuers may favor incorporating information by reference because of
available to accountants to review financial statements and render their opinion. There are detailed pro-
fessional standards governing the accountant's responsibilities in examining the issuer's fiscal year financial
statements and in reviewing interim financial results. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC Ac-
COUNTANTS (AICPA), Statement an Auditing Standards No. /, in CODIFICATION OF AUDITING STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES (1973); AICPA, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 24, in REVIEW OF INTERIM FINAN-
CIAL INFORMATION (1979).
25 See, e.g., Rulemaking Petition of the Securities Industry Association (SIA) to the Commission (May
1, 1978); letter of Joseph McLaughlin, Chairman of SIA Federal Regulation Committee, to Edward F.
Greene, Director of SEC Division of Corporation Finance (Aug. 19, 1980).
26 Section 19(a) of the Securities Act gives the Commission broad authority to adopt "such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter, including . . . defining
accounting, technical, and trade terms used in this subchapter." 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1976). The Commission
has identical general rulemaking authority under § 23(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1976).
The Eighth Circuit has stated that a "properly adopted" rule should be accorded "general judicial accept-
ance. . . unless it undebatedly is unrelated to, non-facilitative of, or in conflict with, the policy of the Act,
or unless it otherwise is so arbitrary or burdensome as to be legally unreasonable." Dyer v. SEC, 226 F.2d
33, 38 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). The courts also defer to an agency's interpretation of its
rules. Seegenerally 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 105-08 (2d ed. 1978). For a reference by
the Commission to its specific authority to set standards in the area of underwriters' duty to investigate, see
text accompanying note 102 infra.
27 See text accompanying notes 11-20 supra.
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reduced costs and preparation time, underwriters may be inclined to oppose such
incorporation, for they will remain liable under section 11 for any omission or
misstatement of material fact in the registration statement at the time it becomes
effective or in any incorporated document unless the Commission or the courts
decide otherwise.
28
A fundamental question which the Commission staff is reviewing, then, is
whether an integrated disclosure system will operate to deprive underwriters of
an opportunity to conduct the reasonable investigation contemplated by section
11. If so, why? Logically, of course, the time needed to prepare issuer docu-
ments (registration statements) is entirely separate from the time needed to verify
information in the documents.29 Yet complaints are heard that reducing the size
of prospectuses means reducing the extent of verification. Is the Commission re-
sponsible? Or is it the increasingly competitive climate of the underwriting busi-
ness that is inducing some underwriters to abbreviate their investigation when
vying to win corporate issuers unwilling to delay filing quickly prepared docu-
ments pending completion of an investigation? Is a contributing factor the fact
that the securities markets, especially the bond markets, are becoming so volatile
that an investigation as thorough as would be desired is not possible if the offer-
ing is to be made in the "window" suddenly opening in the market? Is that a
factor which should properly be taken into account in assessing whether an un-
derwriter has fulfilled his due diligence obligation? And finally, have the Com-
mission's efforts to shorten both preparation time and staff processing time fueled
these competitive pressures and altered the bargaining positions of companies
and underwriters? If the answer to this last question is yes, then should the Com-
mission respond by relaxing, qualifying or defining the existing investigative re-
sponsibilities imposed upon underwriters under the statute? Or should the
question of what is reasonable under the circumstances of an integrated disclo-
sure system be left to a case-by-case determination by the courts?
This article will describe the role of underwriters in the securities distribu-
tion process and the possible effects of an integrated disclosure system upon their
work. The article will then present several alternative approaches to delineating
underwriters' liability under the Securities Act for parts of the registration state-
ment incorporated by reference from corporate periodic reports prepared and
filed with the Commission pursuant to the Exchange Act.
II. The Role of Underwriters in the Securities Distribution Process
Investment bankers provide a broad range of financial services to issuers,
30
but none is more crucial to efficient capital formation than their underwriting of
external corporate financing.3 1 The underwriter's basic function is directly or
28 See text accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
29 Of course, to the extent that in the past the timing of these tasks overlapped, it could be argued that
shortening the former time hampers the underwriter's ability to induce an issuer to defer commencing the
offering until the investigation is completed.
30 For a general description of the capital raising, counseling and support services provided by invest-
ment bankers, see P. DAVEY, INVESTMENT BANKING ARRANGEMENTS 11-17 (Conference Board Report
No. 681, 1976).
31 SeegeneralyJ. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 575-84 (5th ed. 1980).
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indirectly to market securities on behalf of the issuer, and thus to serve as an
intermediary between the issuer and investors.
Underwriters assume the responsibility, and usually some of the risks, of dis-
tributing securities for an issuer in exchange for receiving a portion of the price at
which the securities are sold to the public. 32 With a "firm commitment" ar-
rangement, the underwriters agree to purchase all or most of the offering from
the issuer for a fixed price. With appropriate staff coordination, the underwriting
agreement is signed, the pricing amendment to the registration statement is filed
with the Commission, and the registration statement becomes effective promptly
after the filing of the pricing amendment. 33 Settlement with the issuer occurs
approximately five business days later. Securities are distributed to institutional
and retail purchasers, and the underwriters bear the market risk until the distri-
bution is completed. 34 When securities are marketed on a "best efforts" basis, the
issuer bears the risks because the underwriters making the offering to the public
only promise to be diligent in their efforts to distribute the securities as agents for
the issuer.35 The issuer receives the proceeds only to the extent the securities are
sold.36 Most offerings of securities are made pursuant to firm commitment un-
derwritings. For primary issues registered under the Securities Act during the
first eleven months of 1980, approximately $47.8 billion worth of securities were
underwritten, as opposed to $4.6 billion in securities offered on a best efforts basis
and $6.5 billion in securities sold directly by issuers.
37
There are two primary types of distribution arrangements-the negotiated
approach and the "competitive bidding" approach. Under the negotiated ap-
proach, the process begins with discussion of the proposed offering between the
issuer and an investment banker. Once there is general agreement on the nature
and terms of the issue to be floated, the investment banker decides on the extent
to which the risks of distribution should be shared with other underwriters. 3 An
underwriting syndicate, or purchase group, is then formed, comprised of a
number of underwriters who agree to share the risks and liabilities associated
with the distribution. The contractual obligations among the underwriters par-
32 The underwriter's share is called the "spread" and constitutes the difference between the price paid
by the underwriter for the security and the retail price paid by investors. The size of the spread depends
upon the nature of the security, the quality of the issuer, the volatility of the markets at the time of
offering, and whether it is the issuer's initial public offering. The size of the spread is subject to fair
practice rules of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) if the security is subject to filing
requirements of the Review of Corporate Financing adopted under art. III, § 1 of the Rules of Fair Prac-
tice (NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2151). For example, straight debt issues rated "B" or better by a recognized
rating service need not be filed and are not subject to review.
33 Under § 8 of the Securities Act, the registration statement becomes effective 20 days after filing
unless accelerated by the Commission staff. 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1976). Each amendment causes the 20 day
period to begin again. Underwriters realistically cannot price a firm commitment offering 20 days in
advance of the offering, so the staff must accelerate the registration statement's effective date to allow
pricing and offering when the syndicate believes market conditions are optimal.
34 Perhaps the greatest risk is that the offering will be completed not at the initial offering price but at
a lower retail price which can result in a loss to the underwriter.
35 Although a person distributing securities on a best efforts basis technically is not underwriting the
issue, he is subsumed within the definition of "underwriter" set forth in § 2(11) of the Securities Act,
because such person "offers or sells for an issuer" in connection with the distribution. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l 1)
(1976).
36 SEC, COST OF FLOTATION OF REGISTERED EQUITY IssuEs 1963-1965, 33-34 (1970).
37 SEC, 40 SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REVIEW 28 (Feb. 1981).




ticipating in the distribution are set forth in the "agreement among underwrit-
ers." 39 Almost invariably, the investment banker that originally negotiated with
the issuer to distribute its securities is designated as the managing underwriter for
the purchase group. The managing underwriter generally receives a special fee
from the other underwriters for managing the underwriting and distribution.
40
After the purchase group has been formed, generally, a separate underwrit-
ing agreement is executed between the issuer and the managing underwriter on
the group's behalf. This agreement specifies (1) the agreement of the underwrit-
ers to purchase and resell the issuer's securities, (2) the extent of each under-
writer's participation, (3) the purchase price to be paid to the issuer, (4) the time
and place of closing, (5) the conditions precedent to the underwriters discharg-
ing their obligations, and (6) other matters, including indemnification with re-
spect to misrepresentations in the registration statement and rights of
contribution if liability is imposed. 4 1 The purchase group may contract with an
additional number of dealers, known as the selling group, to assist with the retail
distribution of the security.4 2 Some purchase group members traditionally con-
fined their sales activities to large block sales to institutional investors. Increas-
ingly, however, the largest underwriters have engaged in extensive retail sales to
individual investors.43 The selling group supplements these selling efforts, and its
members are compensated based solely on the amount of securities sold.
The second type of distribution arrangement in which underwriters partici-
pate is "competitive bidding." Under this arrangement the issuer invites bids
from two or more purchase groups. Underwriters form competing syndicates,
which submit bids to the issuer. After the group making the best bid has been
announced, its members decide on the public offering price and the method of
distribution and sale. Virtually all competitively bid offerings are underwritten
on a firm commitment basis. Competitive bidding is ultilized almost exclusively
by issuers compelled to do so in regulated industries.
44
39 The agreement covers, among other things, (1) payment and security delivery terms, (2) designa-
tion of the managing underwriters and the scope of the managers' authority to act on behalf of the
purchase group, including price stabilizing activities, (3) indemnification arrangements among the under-
writers, (4) trading restrictions on the various underwriters with respect to and during the distribution of
the issuer's shares, and (5) the termination date of the offering. Prime, Private Negotiation in The Origination of
Securities, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INVESTMENT BANKING 477, 484-86 (1949).
40 For a form of underwriting agreement see Weiss, The Underwriting 4greement-Form and Commentaq,
26 Bus. LAW. 647 (1971). The form of agreement must be filed as an exhibit to the registration statement,
which is available to the public.
41 Mere "sellers" are subject to civil liability only under § 12 of the Securities Act. They are not
deemed underwriters for purposes of § 11 because the statutory definition of underwriter does "not include
a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual
and customary distributors' or sellers' commission." Securities Act, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1 1). Section
12 imposes liability upon the sellers of a security for any material misstatement or omission in a prospectus
or oral communication. A seller may escape liability by proving that he "did not know, and in the exercise
of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976).
42 Wolfson, Investment Banking, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE SECURI-
TIES MARKETS 412 (1980).
43 The fee is paid not by the issuer but by the other underwriters, because § 11 (e) of the Securities Act
limits an underwriter's liability with respect to a misstatement or omission in the prospectus to the "total
price at which the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public"
unless the underwriter "shall have knowingly receivedfrom the isuer for acting as an underwriter some
benefit, directly or indirectly, in which all other underwriters similarly situated did not share in proportion
to their respective interests in the underwriting." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
44 The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power Commission and the SEC have imposed
such requirements on certain classes bf issuers. See generally Henkel, The Auction Block/or Securities, 36 VA. L.
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Regardless of which type of underwriting arrangement is utilized, the invest-
ment bankers selected by the issuer to distribute the planned offer are expected to
conduct a detailed investigation of the issuer.45 The purpose of this investigation,
historically, was to help the investment banker determine whether the underwrit-
ing would be appropriate in view of the issuer's financial condition and pros-
pects. The investigation associated with negotiated underwritings in the past
generally involved
a more or less prolonged period during which the skilled technicians of the invest-
ment banker [were] working with the executive and financial advisers of the issuer,
studying the business from every angle, becoming familiar with the industry in which
it functions, its future prospects, the character and efficiency of its operating policies
and similar matters.
46
With negotiated underwriting arrangements, the issuer, the managing un-
derwriter and their counsel work together to prepare the registration statement
and prospectus. 47 With competitively bid offerings, however, the issuer usually
designates independent counsel to represent the bidders prior to bidding and to
work with the issuer and its counsel in preparing the registration statement. The
issuer may communicate with the syndicates planning to bid to assure that the
proposed counsel is acceptable to all the syndicates. 4 8 Although the independent
counsel's client is the underwriter, its work with the issuer to prepare the registra-
tion statement occurs without participation by any underwriter because none
will have been selected yet.
49
III. The Effects of the Securities Act Upon Underwriters' Activities
The Securities Act reflects the central role played by underwriters in the
securities distribution process. Section 11 of the Act imposes civil liability upon
underwriters for even the negligent omission or misstatement of material infor-
mation in the registration statement. After initially resisting the standards em-
bodied in section 11,50 the investment banking industry learned how to survive
and even flourish despite its strictures and despite the fact that courts consistently
interpreted the statute to hold underwriters to a relatively high standard of con-
duct.
5 '
REv. 701 (1950). For discussion of the SEC's competitive bidding requirements see text accompanying
notes 226-30 Jzn/a. Some commentators assert that competitive bidding tends to narrow the spread and to
increase the issuer's proceeds from the offering. See, e.g., Kessel, A Study of the Efeats of Competition in the Tax
Exempt Bond Market, 79 J. POLITICAL ECON. 706 (1971); Ederington, Negotiated Versus Competitive Undenorit-
ings of Corporate Bonds, 31 J. FINANCE 17 (1976). However, several studies have disputed this contention.
See Logue & Jarrow, Negotiation vs. Competitive Bidding in the Sale of Securities by Public Utilities, 7 FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT 31 (Autumn 1978).
45 See discussion of underwriters' "due diligence" obligation, text accompanying notes 208-21 in/ra.
46 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
47 Under § 5 of the Securities Act, each confirmation of sale must be accompanied or preceded by a
prospectus containing the information specified in § 10(a), and of course that information must be true
and correct in all material respects. A prospectus may also be any "notice, circular, advertisement, letter,
or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security for sale or confirms the sale."
Securities Act, § 2(10), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1976).
48 Holding Company Act Release No. 3118 (Nov. 7, 1941), [1941-1944 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 75,219; see also Henkel, supra note 44.
49 The process is described in Henkel, supra note 44, at 714-21. For discussion of the effects of such
procedures on the underwriters' responsibility to investigate, see text accompanying notes 227-37 in/ra.
50 See text accompanying notes 82-84 ,fira.
51 This attitude of the courts may help explain why there has been a recent revival, in the context of
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To appreciate the present concerns of underwriters about the extent of their
obligations in an integrated disclosure system, it is necessary to understand the
responsibilities imposed on them by the Securities Act. Generally, section 11 of
the Securities Act, as amended, imposes civil liability where "any part of the
registration statement, when such part became effective, contained an untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be
stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading
... *52 The persons liable for such omissions or misstatements are:
(1) the signers of the registration statement;
(2) the directors or partners of the issuer;
(3) incoming directors or partners named in the registration statement;
(4) the accountants, engineers, appraisers or "any other person whose
profession gives authority to a statement made by him" who con-
sents to being named as having prepared or certified any part of the
registration statement or any report or valuation cited in the regis-
tration statement; and
(5) every underwriter of the security.
53
By including underwriters, Congress recognized that underwriters customarily
are active in preparing the document used to sell the issue, and should thus be
responsible for it.54 Noting the types of persons associated with a public offering
who are excluded from liability under section 11, 55 Professor Ernest Folk has
observed: "In most instances the existence or absence of liability seems approxi-
mately correlated with the person's probable power to influence the content of
the registration statement and the extent to which a purchaser would likely rely
upon that person's authority."
56
Any purchaser of a security offered pursuant to an effective registration
statement 57 can sue any or all of the statutorily specified persons, who are made
jointly and severally liable for damages.58 Although the measure of damages is
the depreciation in the value of the security, in no case can the amount of dam-
proposals to integrate disclosure requirements, of efforts to clarify underwriters' statutory responsibilities
with respect to information contained in periodic reports which they did not help prepare and which are
subsequently incorporated by reference into the prospectus. See SIA Rulemaking Petition, supra note 25,
and discussion of the petition in the text accompanying notes 275-82 infra.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
53 Id. It should be noted that the definition of underwriter excludes sellers of the securities "whose
interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission." Securities Act, § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l 1) (1976).
54 The English custom is for the underwriters to have primary responsibility for drafting the docu-
ments since they sell the security; that custom has not developed here. Issuers and their counsel assume the
primary role, with active assistance by the managing underwriter and its counsel.
55 Persons excluded from § 11 liability include the attorney for the issuer or underwriter, dealers and
brokers selling the security, transfer agents, and other officers or employees of the issuer or underwriter.
56 Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the FederalSecurities Acts: The BarOhris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 1, 12 (1969).
This view is somewhat inconsistent with the fact that participating underwriters are just as liable as the
managing underwriter, "even though they are in no position to duplicate the investigatory function of the
originator or to participate in his activities." Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securties Act of1933, 43 YALE L.
J. 171, 200 (1933).
57 Securities Act, § l1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
58 Id. § 11I(0, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(O (1976). The maximum liability of an underwriter is limited to the
public offering price of the portion of the issue it agreed to underwrite, provided it received no special
inducement from the issuer. See text accompanying note 41 supra and the discussion of§ 1 l(e)'s legislative
history, text accompanying note 88 infra.
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ages exceed the public offering price of the securities. 59 In order to recover, the
plaintiff must prove that he purchased a security issued under an effective regis-
tration statement,60 that the registration statement contained a material omission
or misstatement when it became effective, 6' and that he has complied with the
relatively brief statute of limitations.62 Plaintiff must also establish the extent of
the security's depreciation in value63 and, if he purchased the security after issu-
ance of a financial statement covering at least the twelve months following the
registration statement's effective date, he must prove reliance upon the registra-
tion statement. 64 Otherwise, the plaintiff need not show that he relied upon the
material omission or misstatement, or indeed that he ever read the prospectus.
Beyond contesting the matters which plaintiff must prove, the issuer's only
defense against liability is to prove that the plaintiff purchased the security with
knowledge of the material omission or misstatement. 65 The underwriter and
other defendants, however, have several additional defenses available. 66 Any of
these other defendants can, prior to the effective date of the registration state-
ment, disassociate himself from the offering and notify the Commission of this
fact.67 He can similarly notify the Commission and the public that part of the
registration statement became effective without his knowledge. 68
Finally, and most significant for our purposes, a nonissuer defendant may
prove that he made a reasonable investigation and had reasonable grounds to
believe in the accuracy of the nonexpertised parts of the registration statement
or, with respect to the expertised portions (audited financial statements, for ex-
ample), that he had no reasonable grounds to believe and did not believe that
they contained a material misstatement or omission. 69 This reasonable investiga-
59 Securities Act, § 1 1(g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1976).
60 Id., § 1 l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1967); Lorber
v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). He may have purchased the security in the after market, not
the initial distribution, but he may recover nevertheless if he can trace the shares back to the registration
statement. Such result is possible because reliance need not be proved by the plaintiff under § I 1 unless
the purchase occurred after publication of 12 month financial statements.
61 Securities Act, § 11 (a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976). See Montague v. Electronic Corp. of America, 76
F. Supp. 933, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
62 Securities Act, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). Actions must be brought within one year after the
omission or misstatement was discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. In no event may an action be brought more than three years after the security was offered to the
public. See Osborne v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
63 Securities Act, § 11(g), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(g) (1976).
64 Id., § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1976).
65 Id.
66. § 11 (b) provides defenses available only to nonissuers.
67 The exact language requires:
(1) that before the effective date of the part of the registration statement with respect to which
his liability is asserted (A) he had resigned from or had taken such steps as are permitted by law
to resign from, or ceased or refused to act in, every office, capacity, or relationship in which he
was described in the registration statement as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had advised
the Commission and the issuer in writing that he had taken such action and that he would not
be responsible for such part of the registration statement . ...
Id., § ll(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(1) (1976).
68 Liability is avoided if a defendant can show
that if such part of the registration statement became effective without his knowledge, upon
becoming aware of such fact he forthwith acted and advised the Commission, in accordance
with paragraph (1) of this subsection, and, in addition, gave reasonable public notice that such
part of the registration statement had become effective without his knowledge . . ..
Id., § l1(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(2) (1976).
69 Id., § ll(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3) (1976).
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tion and belief standard was a focal point of legislative attention at the time the
Securities Act was adopted. 70 It also has been a major subject of consideration
by the courts in the few reported cases addressing section 1171 and by the Com-
mission's staff in connection with its effort to streamline the securities registration
process.
72
A. Legislative Hstory of Section II
The capital markets were in complete disarray when President Roosevelt
called on Congress to enact legislation that "puts the burden of telling the whole
truth on the seller" of securities in order to "bring back investor confidence.
' 73
Economic conditions clearly warranted a strong federal response. Half of the $50
billion of new securities offered during the 1920's proved to be worthless. 74 When
investor confidence eventually collapsed, capital formation all but ceased.75 The
House Report on the Securities Act blamed investment bankers for much of the
problem: "The flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was
made possible because of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and
dealers of those standards of fair, honest and prudent dealing that should be
basic to the encouragement of investment in any enterprise." 76 Of course, con-
gressional criticism was not confined to investment bankers. According to James
Landis, one of the drafters of the Securities Act, the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency's lengthy hearings on corporate financing "indicted a system as
a whole that had failed miserably in imposing those essential fiduciary standards
that should govern persons whose function it was to handle other people's
money."
77
Rather than proscribing certain practices, the drafters of the Securities Act
proposed to solve the problems associated with past corporate financings indi-
rectly, by requiring that there be "full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities" sold to the public. 78 Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress intended to
alter conduct at least to the extent necessary to produce adequate disclosure.
The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce stated that the "es-
sential characteristic" of the bill's civil liabilities
consists of a requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the face of
70 See text accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
71 See section III.B. infra.
72 See text accompanying notes 309-17 infra.
73 Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
74 Id. at 2.
75 1 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S Res. 84 and S Res.
56, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1933) (testimony of J.P. Morgan).
76 H.R. REP. No. 85 at 2. As early as 1920, a committee of the Investment Bankers Association had
criticized the spread of irresponsible underwriting practices: "[A]t the present time, when large syndicates
are the rule and offerings are made at once on receipt of a syndicated letter or telegram, it is little exagger-
ation to say that in some cases the distributing banker knows no more about the issue than does his
customer." Quoted in V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 265 (1970). Apparently, the basic
problem was that "investment bankers had to rely almost exclusively on their own values and judgment in
setting individual standards of firm conduct. The result was a range of behavior running from high norms
of most established firms to the excesses, even fraud, of some old and many new houses." Id. at 255.
77 Landis, The Legislative Hitory of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
78 H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933). Representative Sam Rayburn, a sponsor of the
Securities Act, declared that its purpose was to "place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as possi-
ble, with the management of corporations." 77 CONG. REc. 2918 (1933).
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which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held to standards like those
imposed by law upon a fiduciary. Honesty, care, and competence are the demands of
trusteeship. These demands are made by the bill on the directors of the issuer, its
experts, and the underwriters who sponsor the issue.
7 9
The defense of reasonable investigation and belief was included in section 11
to protect persons, other than the issuer, from liability for material misstatements
or omissions which might occur despite their careful investigation of the issue.
8 0
To assist in interpretation of the adequacy of conduct, section 11 (c) specified that
in determining "what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground
for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a person occu-
pying a fiduciary relationship.""'
Although there was general agreement as to the need for federal securities
legislation, enactment of the Securities Act in 1933 produced a cacophonous re-
sponse from the investment community, in part because there was no limitation
of damages to the offering price of the securities actually underwritten by each
underwriter. The result was that each underwriter could be held liable for the
entire offering. The President of the Investment Bankers Association declared:
"[A]n intensive study has been made of it from every angle by potential issuers of
securities, underwriters and their counsel. It is the consensus of those who have
made this study that modifications must be made if sound securities are to be
issued and sold to the public."'8 2 The new law's detractors insisted that its provi-
sions, particularly those relating to civil liability, created such an unmanageable
level of risk that securities offerings were simply not feasible.
8 3 One law professor
predicted that under the new Securities Act "fundamental changes are apt to
develop in securities marketing" including the demise of firm commitment un-
derwritings, and speculated that "much of the underwriting may be done either
by the less desirable bankers of borderline integrity, impecunious or whose wives
will be rich women."
8 4
In an effort to dispel apprehensions about the civil liability standards, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 amended sections 1 1 and 13 of the Securities Act
to reduce nonissuers' exposure to civil liability. First, section 11 (a) was amended
to require the plaintiff to prove reliance upon the registration statement where
the issuer had published an earnings statement covering at least a period of
twelve months after the effective date of the registration statement. The ration-
ale for the change was that subsequent purchasers in these circumstances would
79 H.R. REP. No. 85 at 5.
80 Id. at 23.
81 Securities Act, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976).
82 Gordon, Benefits of Secunry Regulation, in 4 INVESTMENT BANKING 4, 8 (Oct. 7, 1933).
83 See, e.g., the statement of J. Augustus Barnard, Director, American Investment Bankers Associa-
tions: "[IJf it were not for fear engendered by the Securities Act, there would be many new issues put out
and . . . there would be an excellent market for high-grade bonds." Winthrop W. Aldrich, President of
Chase National Bank, testified that
leading security houses, and many of our largest corporations, are actually afraid to undertake
public offerings under the act. ...
. . . What excites anxiety are some of the civil liabilities imposed upon issuers and under-
writers of securities, as well as upon directors and officers of corporations, uncertainty of its
liabilities, and in some respects the unequal incidence of the liabilities in relationship to the
damage that may be done or in proportion to the risks involved.
8 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Curremy on S Res. 84 and S Res. 56,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4122 (1933).
84 James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV. 624, 661 (1934).
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likely be relying on information in the earnings statement rather than on the
registration statement containing the misstatement or omission.8 5 Second, the
diligence standard of section 11(b) (3) (C) and (D), applicable to the expertised
parts of the registration statement, was transformed from an affirmative to a neg-
ative standard. 86 Third, the standard of reasonableness set forth in section 11 (c)
was restated from "that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship"
to "that required of a prudent man in the management of his own property. '8 7
Fourth, section 11 (e), pertaining to recoverable damages, was extensively revised.
Each participating underwriter's liability (which under the original Securities
Act potentially extended to the aggregate price of the entire offering) was now
limited to the public offering price of the portion of the offering which he under-
wrote. The amended section 11(e) also permitted the defendant to reduce the
amount of damages by proving that some or all of the depreciation in the secur-
ity's value resulted from matters unrelated to the material omission or misstate-
ment.88 Finally, the statute of limitations set forth in section 13 was changed in
two ways. The period during which suit could be brought under section 11 was
shortened from two years to one year from the date the omission or misstatement
was discovered or should have been discovered. The maximum period during
which suit could be brought also was reduced from ten to three years after the
security was offered.
Commenting upon the Securities Act shortly after its adoption, Professor
Harry Shulman observed:
[T]he provisions for civil liability are calculated to be largely preventive rather than
redressive. Both in the extent of liability imposed-the variety of persons to whom
the liability attached, the basis of the liability and the persons in whose favor it
runs-and in the limitation of amounts recoverable, the in lerrorem function of the Act
is evidenced. The Act seeks not only to secure accuracy in the information that is
volunteered to investors but also, and perhaps more especially, to compel the disclo-
sure of significant matters which were heretofore rarely, if ever, disclosed. Civil lia-
bility is imposed largely as one appropriate means of accomplishing these ends, not as
an end in itself .... 89
Despite the considerable relaxation of civil liabilities in the Securities Act attribu-
table to the Exchange Act amendments, the provisions of section 11 appear to
have functioned reasonably well to prevent inadequate disclosure-a fact evi-
85 H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934). Notwithstanding the change, plaintiffs still do
not have to show actual reliance on the registration statement before publication of an earnings statement;
reliance is presumed.
86 The language "he had reasonable ground to believe" was replaced with "he had no reasonable
ground to believe and did not believe that . . . the statements therein were untrue ....
87 A memorandum explaining the proposed change stated that "the term 'fiduciary relationship' has
been terrifyingly portrayed. The amendment substitutes for that language the accepted common-law defi-
nition of the duty of a fiduciary." 78 CONG. REC. 8669 (1934).
88 Thus, in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the court
found that part of the depreciation in value of the security was due to a "very drastic general decline in the
stock market," and that to the extent of that drop "plaintiff's damages were not 'caused' by" defendant's
actions. Id. at 586. The damage figure was reduced by multiplying the amount paid by the reciprocal of
the decline in the Standard and Poor's index during the period in question. Id.
89 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L. J. 227 (1933). William 0. Douglas and
George B. Bates judged that civil liabilities "have been set high to guarantee that the risk of their invoca-
tion will be effective in assuring that the 'truth about securities' will be told." Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L. J. 171, 173 (1933).
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denced by the very infrequent reported litigation involving section 11 claims.90
Moreover, the fact that the amendments did not go further suggests that Con-
gress believed underwriters played a critical role in assuring that companies tell
the whole truth when issuing securities.
B. Underwriters' Responsibility in the Courts
In 1969, Professor Louis Loss computed that only twenty-three cases, re-
ported and unreported, raising section 11 claims had gone to final judgment
since enactment of the federal securities acts. 91 Of this total, in only two cases
did plaintiffs recover under section 1192 while six others were judicially approved
settlements of class action suits. 93 Nearly all of the few reported cases deal, at
least to some extent, with the reasonable investigation (or "due diligence") de-
fense. Two of the reported cases and one settlement of an administrative pro-
ceeding help chart the course of the evolving professional responsibilities of
underwriters and hence warrant consideration. In addition, a reported case in-
volving liability under section 12(2) of the Securities Act may shed further light
on the obligations of underwriters.
1. In re The Richmond Corp.: Reasonable Investigation as a Duty
The earliest relevant case, In re The Richmond Corp .,94 was a stop order pro-
ceeding instituted by the Division of Corporation Finance against The Rich-
mond Corporation to suspend the effectiveness of a registration statement filed in
1961 covering 142,858 shares of the issuer's common stock, 36,500 warrants and
an identical number of additional shares to be issued upon exercise of the war-
rants. The underwriting was to be on a best efforts basis. The Commission
found the registration statement false and misleading in that it failed to include a
summary statement describing the speculative aspects of the offering, 95 and
failed to disclose (1) the intended use of over half of the net proceeds as well as
the proposed order of priority of use, 96 (2) the existence and nature of potential
conflicts of interest relating to competitive real estate practices of its officers and
90 "[T]he liability provisions have had the in terrorem effect of creating an extraordinarily high sense of
care and responsibility in the preparation of registration statements." Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited,
79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1355 (1966). See 3 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION 1721 (2d ed. 1961). In
addition to § l1's preventive effect, there may be other explanations for the dearth of cases. For example,
§ 1 (e) provides that in any proceeding under the Securities Act the court may require an undertaking for
the payment of litigation costs, including attorney's fees, and, ifjudgment is rendered against a party, may
assess costs if it believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976).
Comparable provisions were not included in the Exchange Act and are therefore not applicable to suits
alleging violations of § 10 and rule lOb-5 thereunder. But Professor Loss believes that "probably the
greatest single deterrent to § I 1 actions has been the Commission's careful examination of registration
statements." Id. at 1690. It has also been noted that "most of the registration statements that are filed
have errors or omissions of one kind or another that aren't caught, that might or might not be material, for
which there is fortunately not an opportunity to test or challenge simply because the price of the stock goes
up." Panel Discussion, Advice to My Client, 24 Bus. LAw. 573, 621 (1969) (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin).
91 Since 1969 there have been additional recoveries and settlements. L. Loss, supra note 90, at 3821.
92 Martin v. Hull, 92 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726 (1937); and Escott v. BarChris
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93 See L. Loss, supra note 90, at 1688, 3823.
94 41 S.E.C. 398 (1963).
95 Id. at 404.
96 Id. at 401.
[June 19811
INVESTMENT BANKERS
directors,97 and (3) the underwriter's inexperience and failure to form a selling
group in connection with the best efforts offering which could affect the success of
the offering. 98
Although the underwriter was not a party to the proceeding, the Commis-
sion's opinion included a lengthy discussion of the deficient nature of the under-
writer's performance, with emphasis on its failure to fulfill its investigatory
responsibilities. 99 The stipulation of facts entered into by the Division of Corpo-
ration Finance and the issuer indicated that the underwriter's investigation had
consisted solely of visiting the issuer's principal properties, examining its stock
list, and obtaining a credit report on the company. The underwriter apparently
had relied upon management's representations on all other matters bearing on
the registration statement. The Commission found that "such a limited investi-
gation by an underwriter does not measure up to the degree of care, reasonable
under the circumstances, necessary for and required of an underwriter to satisfy
himself as to the accuracy and adequacy of the representations in the prospec-
tus."10 0 Satisfactory performance on this responsibility was especially important
in the Commission's view:
By associating himself with a proposed offering, an underwriter impliedly represents
that he has made such an investigation in accordance with professional standards.
Investors properly rely on this added protection which has a direct bearing on their
appraisal of the reliability of the representations in the prospectus.
The underwriter who does not make a reasonable investigation is derelict in his
responsibilities to deal fairly with the investing public. Such dereliction, moreover,
does not serve the statutory objective of achieving a prospectus for the sale of securi-
ties which, in all material respects, contains the information necessary for an in-
formed evaluation of the securities offered.101
The Commission's proceeding in Richmond suggests strongly that an under-
writer has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation within the meaning of
section 11 in connection with any public offering with which it is associated.
Some members of the bar strenuously dispute the Commission's position that
such a duty exists. In their view, the reasonable investigation referred to in sec-
tion 11 is simply a defense to avoid the imposition of liability. Thus, no sanctions
are appropriate if an underwriter performs no investigation whatsoever provided
there is no false statement in the registration or, even if there is one, provided no
lawsuit is commenced. The Commission staff believes that by associating his
name with an offering as an underwriter, the underwriter "sponsors" the offering
and therefore, consistent with notions of fair and equitable practices, makes an
implied representation that he has investigated the affairs of- the issuer. The
staff's belief is buttressed by the customary practice of prominently displaying
the name of the managing underwriter on the cover of the prospectus. The Com-
mission has concluded that "[t]he public looks to the underwriter for protection
and expects him to verify the accuracy of the statements in the registration state-
ment." °1 0 2 If no such investigation had been undertaken, appropriate disclosure
97 Id. at 402.
98 Id. at 403.
99 Id. at 404-06.
100 Id. at 405. See also In re Charles E. Bailey & Co., 35 S.E.C. 33 (1953).
101 41 S.E.C. at 406 (footnote omitted).
102 Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 27, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,011, 16,013 (1972).
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would be necessary to avoid the imposition of sanctions. However, if such disclo-
sure were made, it is extremely unlikely that the Commission or its staff could
make the findings necessary to accelerate the registration statement. Section 8(a)
allows the Commission to accelerate "having due regard to the adequacy of the
information respecting the issuer theretofore available to the public . . . and to
the public interest and the protection of investors."' 0 3 It also is evident from the
House Report on the bill, as reiterated by James Landis, who helped draft the
Securities Act and the House Report, that Congress intended to impose a duty of
"care and competence" upon those subject to section 11, including underwrit-
ers.1 0 4 The House Report explained that
the provisions throwing upon the defendant in suits under sections 11 and 12 the
burden of proof to exempt himself are indispensable to making the buyer's remedies
under those sections practically effective. Every lawyer knows that with all the facts
in the control of the defendant it is practically impossible for a buyer to prove a state
of knowledge or a failure to exercise due care on the part of defendant. Unless re-
sponsibility is to involve merely paper liability it is necessary to throw the burden of
disproving responsibility for reprehensible acts of omission or commission on those
who purport to issue statements for the public's reliance. The responsibility imposed
is no more nor less than that of a trust. 105
2. Escolt v. BarChris Construction Corp.: Determining Reasonableness in Light
of the Surrounding Circumstances
While Richmond stands for the proposition view that independent investiga-
tion of the issuer is a duty underwriters cannot readily avoid, it was not until
1968, thirty-five years after adoption of the Securities Act, that a court first at-
tempted to define what constitutes a reasonable investigation "under the circum-
stances" with respect to the different classes of persons named in section 11 (a). In
Escoti v. BarChrls Construction Corp.,'0 6 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York set forth parameters to the investigatory responsi-
bilities of signers of the registration statement, inside and outside directors, ac-
countants, managing underwriters and participating underwriters. BarChris was
in the business of constructing and equipping bowling alleys. Because its method
of operations required it to expend significant funds before receiving sizable pay-
ments from customers or from the factor it utilized, 0 7 adequate cash flow was a
recurrent problem. Part of the proceeds from the debenture offering giving rise
to the suit would, according to the prospectus for the offering, be used to help
meet its working capital needs. The registration statement covering the $3.5 mil-
lion issue of subordinated convertible debentures became effective on May 16,
1961. The following year BarChris filed a petition in bankruptcy and defaulted
103 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1976).
104 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933). Secalso Landis, The Legislative Histoq ofthe Securities
Act, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29, 48 (1959).
105 H.R. REP. No. 85 at 10.
106 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
107 BarChris either (1) sold its bowling alleys to customers who made a small down payment and
contracted to pay the balance in installments over a number of years, or (2) utilized a sale-leaseback
approach, whereby it sold an "interior package" for a bowling alley to its factor who, in turn, leased the




on interest payable on the debentures.108 Thereafter a class action suit was
brought against the defendants seeking recovery under section 11.
The court found that the prospectus issued in connection with the offering
was false and misleading in several respects. The use of proceeds section of the
prospectus failed to disclose that funds earmarked for "additional" working capi-
tal to be used in the "expansion" of construction were in fact to be used primarily
to pay off prior debts.10 9 Nor did the section disclose that the deteriorating credit
record of BarChris's customers might, pursuant to its agreement with the factor,
necessitate the repurchase of over $1.3 million of customers' notes held by the
factor. ' 10 The description of business section failed to disclose that in addition to
its construction, manufacturing, and sales activities, BarChris, due in part to cus-
tomer defaults, was operating bowling alleys. The court found that the operation
of bowling alleys amounted to "a different business" involving "different
problems and different risks.""' The prospectus overstated BarChris's net oper-
ating income, earnings per share, net sales, and backlog of unfilled orders, while
understating BarChris's contingent liabilities." 2 The court's painstakingly de-
tailed discussion of the various defendants' conduct in relation to their asserted
due diligence defenses provides considerable insight into the manner in which the
district court judge believed section 11 responsibilities were to be discharged in
connection with offerings made in the 1960's. For the purpose of this article,
however, only the court's analysis of the underwriters' conduct need be discussed.
Eight investment banking firms participated in distributing BarChris's de-
bentures, with Drexel & Co. acting as the managing underwriter. Drexel's attor-
ney served as attorney for the syndicate." r3 In order to decide whether Drexel
should underwrite a financing, a Drexel partner undertook a preliminary investi-
gation of BarChris's financial condition in the fall of 1960. Drexel and BarChris
signed a letter of intent"14 in February 1961.
In March 1961, representatives from Drexel and BarChris met three times to
discuss the prospectus drafted by BarChris's counsel. These due diligence meet-
ings offered Drexel and its counsel an opportunity to explore with BarChris's
management the adequacy of disclosure contained in the drafts of the registra-
tion statement. The underwriter posed questions regarding a number of impor-
tant issues, including the reserve for bad debts, the accuracy of backlog figures,
the description of the use of proceeds, BarChris's past experience in repurchasing
customers' notes, whether BarChris operated any bowling alleys, and loans made
to the company by its officers."- 5
Drexel also made some effort to obtain documentation relating to the repre-
sentations made in the registration statement. Drexel instructed its counsel to
review pertinent corporate records, and counsel determined to examine Bar-
108 Id. at 654.
109 Id. at 675-76.
110 Id. at 676-78. A factor purchases trade receivables with or without recourse. The factor receives a
commission on advances against receivables.
111 Id. at 678.
112 Id. at 668-71.
113 Id. at 692.
114 A letter of intent is a nonbinding written statement of the terms of underwriting prepared by the
originating underwriter and addressed to the issuer.
115 Id. at 693-94.
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Chris's minutes for the past five years and its major contracts. 1 6 The minutes of
board meetings and of several executive committee meetings were examined by a
very junior associate at the law firm, but written summaries of other executive
committee meetings were missing and were not sought out because counsel ac-
cepted at face value a company official's statement that the meetings dealt only
with "routine" matters.'t7 As it turned out, examination of the missing minutes
or the minutes of the company's subsidiaries would have revealed some of the
matters inadequately disclosed in the registration statement. Counsel examined
an insurance policy but apparently did not examine the agreement with Bar-
Chris's factor or any customer contracts or accounting records. No effort was
made to review BarChris's schedule of delinquencies, the factor's notices of delin-
quencies, or BarChris's correspondence with the factor.
The court refused to find this inquiry reasonable, concluding that "[tlo effec-
tuate the statute's purpose, the phrase 'reasonable investigation' must be con-
strued to require more effort on the part of the underwriters than the mere
accurate reporting in the prospectus of 'data presented' to them by the com-
pany.' 1 8 Noting that the positions of underwriter and issuer are somewhat ad-
verse," 9 the court declared:
In order to make the underwriters' participation in this enterprise of any value to the
investors, the underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data
submitted to them. They may not rely solely on the company's officers or on the
company's counsel. A prudent man in the management of his own property would
not rely on them. 120
Drexel was held bound by its counsel's failure to make a reasonable investigation,
as were the participating underwriters who relied upon Drexel and its attor-
neys.' 2  The court believed underwriters were obliged to verify that all material
facts had been addressed and accurately presented in the registration statement.
This verification required independent inquiry, investigation and analysis by the
underwriters. 122
The BarChris opinion engendered lively discussion among professionals.1
23
While there was some disagreement over where the court had drawn the line,
there was general agreement that more attention should be paid to reviewing
documentation. In commenting on the opinion, one attorney did not find this
prospect particularly troubling:
116 Id. at 694.
117 Id. at 695.
118 Id. at 697.
119 The court explained: "It is not unlikely that statements made by company officers to an under-
writer to induce him to underwrite may be self-serving. They may be unduly enthusiastic. As in this case,
they may, on occasion, be deliberately false." Id. at 696.
120 Id. at 697. The court added its belief that "[i]t is impossible to lay down a rigid rule suitable for
every case defining the extent to which such verification must go. It is a question of degree, a matter of
judgment in each case." Id.
121 Id.
122 Presumably BarChris's periodic reports, which also described its business, were also false and mis-
leading and if they had been incorporated by reference the prospectus would have been deficient. Since
the prospectus was a stand alone document, however, the underwriters concentrated on it.
123 See especially Folk, supra note 56. See also Heller, Weiss, Israels & Schwartz, BarChris: A Dialogue on a
Bad Case Making Hard Law, 57 GEo. L. J. 221 (1968); Panel Discussion, Advice to My Client, 24 Bus. LAW.
573 (1969); Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968); Comment, Bar-




All that is required, I think, is the obvious good sense of reading all corporate docu-
ments including minutes, having them read by a responsible attorney, of course and
the same thing with the company's contracts. The lesson of the BarChris case is that
if such procedures are not followed, the result may be disastrous.
1 2 4
Another commentator concluded that
the real significance of the case . . . must be assessed by the effect it has on the
quality of information which is disseminated to.the investing public. Basically, the
other issues dealing with the very real and practical problem of how to comply with
its edict, are subservient to this consideration.
1 25
3. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.: Varying the Degree of
Investigation Based Upon the Accessibility of Information
Three years later, in 1971, another district court handed down a decision
regarding underwriters' liability which proved somewhat more favorable to un-
derwriters. Fet v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp t 26 was a class action suit
brought by former shareholders of Reliance Insurance Company (Reliance)
against Leasco, its directors and underwriters. During an exchange offer, plain-
tiffs had exchanged their Reliance shares for Leasco shares registered pursuant to
an effective S-1 registration statement. 2 7 They alleged that Leasco's registration
statement failed to provide an estimate of the amount of "surplus surplus"12 8
held by Reliance and failed to indicate Leasco's plans for rechannelling surplus
surplus for its own benefit. As was customary, the registration statement was
prepared primarily by Leasco's attorneys and reviewed by the dealer-manag-
ers,' 29 White, Weld & Co. and Lehman Brothers, and their counsel.
The evidence indicated that Leasco was interested in acquiring Reliance
primarily because the insurance company had a large amount of excess capital
(or "surplus surplus") which Leasco could tap if Reliance were reorganized. Ap-
proximately six months before the exchange offer, Leasco's Vice President for
Corporate Planning had prepared a report which recommended the takeover of
Reliance and estimated the amount of Reliance's surplus surplus to be $125 mil-
lion as of June 30, 1967 and $100 million at the end of 1967.130
Despite Leasco's intense interest in Reliance's surplus surplus, the prospectus
for the exchange offer made only a vague reference to it. The prospectus stated
that Leasco favored operating the insurance company within the framework of a
holding company because such a framework would provide "more flexible opera-
tions, freedom of diversification and opportunities for more profitable utilization
124 Panel Discussion, supra note 123; at 620 (remarks of Graham L. Sterling). Mr. Sterling's statement
makes sense in the context of a small offering for a small issuer. However, the extent to which such
documentation must or should be reviewed when the issuer is a large multinational corporation is not
clear.
125 Statement of Professor Donald Schwartz, in Heller, supra note 123, at 239.
126 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
127 The S-1 registration statement is described in note 22 supra.
128 The term refers to "the highly liquid assets of an insurance company which can be utilized in non-
regulated enterprises." 332 F. Supp. at 551.
129 A dealer-manager solicits acceptance of exchange offers. A dealer-manager is deemed to be an
underwriter as defined in § 2(11) of the Securities Act, because it assists an issuer in connection with
distribution of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976).
130 332 F. Supp. at 551.
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of financial resources."' 3 1 The court found the prospectus to be false and mis-
leading because of its failure to describe Leasco's plans for the insurance com-
pany in greater detail or to provide an estimate of the amount of surplus
surplus. 132 The court rejected Leasco's argument that it could not be more spe-
cific or accurately estimate the surplus surplus due to Reliance's hostility to the
tender offer and refusal to make the pertinent information available.' 33 In this
regard, the court placed special emphasis on the fact that only a few months after
the tender period ended, Leasco filed another Form S- 1 registration statement for
a different offering which estimated Reliance's surplus surplus at $125 million. '
3 4
While finding Leasco and its officer-directors civilly liable for failing to meet
their section 11 duty to investigate the adequacy and completeness of the regis-
tration statement, the court exculpated the dealer-manager/underwriters. With
respect to the treatment of surplus surplus, the court noted that White Weld's
representative was "fully aware of the complexity of the computation prob-
lem.' 1 35 The representative had discussed the matter at several due diligence
meetings and had examined pertinent documents, including the Leasco vice pres-
ident's memorandum containing the estimate of surplus surplus.' 36 Leasco had
informed the underwriters and their counsel, however, that Reliance's manage-
ment would neither provide information nor verify the accuracy of Leasco's esti-
mates. The underwriters were aware of an agreement between Leasco and
Reliance dated August 1, 1968 which terminated Reliance's hostility to the take-
over. But Leasco substantiated its position by presenting the underwriters with
copies of a July 1968 telegram from a Reliance official and an August 13, 1968
letter from Leasco's counsel to the Commission indicating that Reliance was un-
willing to furnish pertinent information.137 The court stated that "[t]hough the
finding might have gone the other way, on balance" the dealer-managers reason-
ably investigated and reasonably verified Leasco's representations that access to
Reliance's management was not possible.
138
Undoubtedly the most significant message of Leasco for underwriters func-
tioning in an integrated disclosure system is the general principle set out by the
court during its discussion of the officer-directors' liability. The court declared:
"What constitutes 'reasonable investigation' and a 'reasonable ground to believe'
will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual, his expertise, and his
access to the pertinent information and data."' 3 9 Although the implications of
131 Id. at 552.
132 Id. at 574-75.
133 The two companies resolved their differences in an agreement dated August 1, 1968. The registra-
tion statement became effective on August 19, 1968. Id. at 556.
134 Id. at 560.
135 Id. at 582.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 583.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 577. The case suggests that a court should consider the likelihood of an underwriter being
able to verify information (and have access to appropriate backup material with respect to it) incorporated
by reference from documents prepared earlier. Although this may well be the case, the outcome of Leasco
must be viewed in its factual context-that of a hostile exchange offer in which the omission complained of
was informaton about the target which the underwriter reasonably believed to be uncooperative. Lack of
cooperation by an issuer in a negotiated offering is a totally different matter. See in this regard the discus-
sion of § 1704(a) of the proposed Federal Securities Code of the American Law Institute, text accompany-
ing notes 311-17 infra.
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this statement vis-a-vis underwriters' responsibilities within an integrated disclo-
sure system will be analyzed later in this article, 140 it is worth emphasizing now
that the court's analysis of the variability of investigatory duties owed by differ-
ent persons associated with the issuer would seem equally applicable with respect
to underwriters' liability. The court appeared to say that what is "reasonable"
depends in part upon the nature of the person involved and of the information to
which he has access. After observing that more would be expected of inside di-
rectors intimately familiar with corporate affairs and the particular transactions
at issue than of outside directors, the court added: "Similarly, accountants and
underwriters are expected to investigate to various degrees."1 4 1 In evaluating the
reasonableness of the underwriters' conduct in Leasco, the court considered the
nature of the transaction, the underwriters' relationship to the issuer and their
access to the underlying data.
In Leasco, the apparent basis for the underwriters' reasonable reliance upon
the £rsuer, Leasco, was the unavailability of the information from the target, Reli-
ance, needed to verify the estimates of surplus surplus.142 Documents reviewed
by the underwriters indicated that Reliance was hostile to the tender offer and
implied that it would not produce the information even after its resistance to the
tender offer ended. In this situation, the court concluded that it was reasonable
for the underwriters to rely upon Leasco's officers, who asserted that without
confirmation by Reliance the estimate by Leasco should not be included in the
prospectus. 143
More generally, the case implies that a variety of other circumstances may
deprive the underwriter of access to information essential to establishing that he
conducted a reasonable investigation under section 11. The relevance of the type
of underwriting arrangement is intimated by the court's observation that the
"[d]ealer-managers cannot. . . be expected to possess the intimate knowledge of
corporate affairs of inside directors, and their duty to investigate should be con-
sidered in light of their more limited access." 144
The court's extension of a variable standard applicable to underwriters,
while criticized by some, 14 5 appears consistent with the intentions of Congress.
The House Committee recognized that "the duty of care to discover varies in its
demands upon participants in security distribution with the importance of their
place in the scheme of distribution and with the degree of protection that the
public has a right to expect."'146 The Conference Committee Report on the Se-
curities Act authorized "delegation of the performance of acts which it is unrea-
sonable to require" the person to perform personally.' 4 7 The test in such cases
140. See section VI infra.
141 332 F. Supp. at 578 (emphasis added).
142 Even though Leasco was making a hostile exchange offer, Form S-1 required the inclusion by
Leasco of information about Reliance to the extent available. The underwriters would understandably be
reluctant to include in the registration statement an estimate of excess cash which was not the subject of an
audit, was substantial in amount, and was subject to the provisions of § 11, unless they were reasonably
certain of its accuracy.
143 332 F. Supp. at 550, 561-62, 582.
144 Id. at 582.
145 See, e.g., R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 830-31 (4th ed. 1977).
146 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1933).
147 H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
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would be whether "reliance is reasonable in light of all the circumstances."' 148
When a syndicate is involved, this means that there can be variation among the
underwriters in the investigation performed. Participating underwriters may
delegate to the managing underwriter the responsibility to conduct the investiga-
tion, but the Commission has stated that it will not consider the delegation rea-
sonable unless the participating underwriter "satisqies] himself that the
managing underwriter makes the kind of investigation the participant would
have performed if he were the manager."t 49 Thus, the participating underwriter
usually limits its investigation to ascertaining that reliance upon the managing
underwriter is reasonable. This makes sense if redundant investigations are to be
avoided1 50 and is consistent with the view of James Landis, who declared shortly
after the Securities Act was adopted that "reasonability . . . will differ widely
according to the person involved."' t  With regard to underwriters, Landis ob-
served:
[T]he type of investigation which can reasonably be demanded of the sponsoring or
principal underwriters is one thing; that which the Act requires of the small partici-
pating underwriter in order that he satisfy its requirements is another thing, while an
even less standard of investigation would be demanded of the dealer selling on com-
mission who, because of his relationship to the issuer, is considered as an underwriter
by the Act. 152
The importance of this principle to underwriters in the future will become more
apparent after a description of the changes occurring in the disclosure environ-
ment and the impact of these changes upon underwriters' opportunity to investi-
gate.
4. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co.: The Relationship Between Underwriters'
Responsibilities Under Section 12(2) and Section 11
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co. 153 was a class action suit brought by purchasers
of commercial paper of Winter & Hirsh, Inc. (WH) following its default on the
notes. Founding their suit on section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 12(2)
of the Securities Act, the plaintiffs claimed that Nuveen and its control persons
had failed to conduct the reasonable investigation required of an underwriter
prior to selling underwritten securities to the public. ' 54 Between September 1968
and February 1970, Nuveen purchased virtually all of WH's commercial paper
148 Id.
149 Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26, 1972), [Special Edition No. 434] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
I 4506B.
150 As one district court recently observed, "[although supplementary, independent inquiries by the
participating underwriters might occasionally dredge up an additional misstatement, the margin of im-
provement probably would not warrant the expense and confusion of proliferating inquiries." In re the
Gap Stores Sec. Litigation 79 F.R.D. 283, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
151 Landis, Liabilio Sections of the Securities Act Authoritatively Discussed, 18 AM. ACCOUNTANT 330 (1933).
152 Id. at 332.
153 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981) (Sanders IV).
The other three decisions in the Sanders case appear at 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972) (Sanders!); 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929 (1976) (Sanders!!); and
554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977) (Sanders III).
154 Commercial paper is exempt from registration under the Securities Act by reason of § 3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1976). Nevertheless, sales are still subject to § 12(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77/(2) (1976), and the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act, including rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
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for resale to Nuveen's customers, and in the ensuing legal action Nuveen and the
other defendants accepted plaintiffs' terming Nuveen an underwriter.1 5 5 Nuveen
made no investigation into the business or financial condition of WH prior to
marketing its commercial paper initially to institutional and individual investors.
Nuveen did regularly review WH's semiannual financial statements prepared by
its independent certified public accountant, and in 1969 a credit analyst with
Nuveen examined WH's accounts receivable and its collection procedures.156
Nuveen did not, however, review the minutes, material contracts, accounting
work papers or tax returns of WH. In January 1970, Nuveen inquired about
WH's credit worthiness with its ten bank creditors. All the responses were either
neutral or favorable. Also in January, two of WH's lenders insisted that WH
replace its current auditor. The new auditor quickly discovered that the com-
pany's accounts receivable were overstated by $14 million, and that there was
unreported indebtedness of $1.75 million. Soon it was also clear that the com-
pany's swelling financial imbalance had been concealed by the prior accountants
for at least ten years. Section 11 of the Securities Act was not applicable because
commercial paper is exempt from registration and therefore not sold pursuant to
an effective registration statement. However, after establishing in Sanders I that
commercial paper is a security under the Exchange Act,1 57 the Seventh Circuit in
Sanders II concluded that the standards of rule lOb-5 require underwriters to
make a reasonable investigation of the issuer similar to that required to establish
a defense under section 11, and that "Nuveen's investigation of WH was deficient
and. . . an appropriate investigation would have revealed the fraud."' 158 As the
court in Sanders II explained, "a greater quantity of information is 'reasonably
ascertainable' by an underwriter than by a mere broker, and something more
than published data must be analyzed if an underwriter is to discharge his duty
of investigation."1 59 The defendant's appeal to the Supreme Court led to dismis-
sal of the section 10(b) claims in Sanders III because the scienter required by the
Court's intervening decision in Emst & Ernst v. Hochfelder16 ° could not be
shown. 161
The case then was remanded to the district court for consideration of plain-
tiffs' section 12(2) claims. Section 12(2) imposes liability on any person who "of-
fers or sells a security. . . by means of a prospectus or oral communication" that
misstates or omits material information. 62 Nuveen's distribution of commercial
paper reports describing WH's paper to some purchasers was held in Sanders IV
to satisfy the prospectus requirement, because the dissemination of the reports
could have affected the price that all purchasers paid for the notes.
163
Section 12(2) provides a defense for sellers who "in the exercise of reasonable
care could not have known" of the inaccuracy.164 The Seventh Circuit panel in
155 Sanders !! at 1067.
156 Id.
157 Sanders I at 1080.
158 Sanders!! at 1071.
159 Id.
160 425 U.S. 185 (1976). See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
161 Sanders III at 792.
162 Securities Act, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
163 Sanders IV at 1227.
164 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
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Sanders IV, citing with approval the reasoning in Sanders II, found that this de-
fense was unavailable to a seller who was also an underwriter and who had failed
to make a reasonable investigation that would have uncovered the issuer's
fraud.' 65 The court added that "[s]ince what constitutes reasonable care under
§ 12(2) depends upon the circumstances, we, of course, do not intimate that the
duty of a seller under § 12(2) is always the same as that of an underwriter in a
registration offering under § 11."166 The court thus implicitly distinguished the
duties of an underwriter and those of a mere seller under section 12(2). But al-
though the court appeared to equate the duties of an underwriter under section
11 with those under section 12(2), it came close to requiring more investigation
by an underwriter of a nonregistered offering than by an underwriter of a regis-
tered offering. For example, the opinion in Sanders II, cited with approval in
Sanders IV, criticized the underwriter's failure to verify the contents of WH's
audited financial statements or to review the work papers of the accountants
67
a level of investigation not required by section 11, which permits the underwriter
to rely on the audited financial statements so long as he "had no reasonable
ground to believe, and did not believe" that the statements were untrue or omit-
ted material information. 168
Although the Supreme Court refused to review the decision in Sanders IV,
Justice Powell wrote an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, in which
Justice Rehnquist joined. 169 Justice Powell expressed concern that the decision
would "be read as recognizing no distinction between the standards of care appli-
cable under §§ 11 and 12(2), and particularly as casting doubt upon the reasona-
bleness of relying upon the expertise of certified public accountants."', 70 Justice
Powell took the position that "almost by definition, it is reasonable [for an under-
writer] to rely on financial statements certified by public accountants."', 7' On
the other hand, the court of appeals in Sanders II found that WH's disclosure
deficiencies also would have been detected if the underwriter had reviewed the
corporate minutes, 17 2 and it is customary for underwriters to review the minutes
as part of their section 11 investigation.
In his dissent, Justice Powell did not refer to the views expressed in the ami-
cus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the United States. In urging the court to
deny the petition for a writ of certiorari, the Solicitor General contended that
[e]ven if, as a general matter, Sections 11 and 12(2) impose distinct standards of care,
a standard of care that is the same or similar to that imposed by Section 11 may be
appropriate in this unusual factual situation-involving an unregistered offering hav-
ing many of the characteristics normally associated with an offering required to be
registered. In these circumstances, the standard of "reasonable care" under Section
12(2) may converge with the standard of "reasonable investigation" prescribed under
Section 11.173
165 Sanders IV at 1227-28.
166 Id. at 1228.
167 Sanders I at 1067-68, cited in Sanders IV at 1227.
168 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)1(3)(C) (1976).
169 John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981).
170 Id. at 3707.
171 Id.
172 Sanders ! at 1069.
173 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7-8 (Sanders IV) (footnote omitted).
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Sanders involved an unusual fact situation, but conveys the clear message
that underwriters of offerings exempt from the registration provisions of the Se-
curities Act should still make a reasonable investigation of the accuracy of infor-
mation contained in the prospectus. To the extent that such underwriters
proceed to sell the exempt securities pursuant to an inaccurate prospectus, they
may be held to a standard of investigation similar to that set forth in section 11.
Moreover, the steps the underwriters failed to take (for example, reading tax
returns) may be steps a court will now require to sustain a section 11 defense,
although as noted above there are significant doubts as to whether these steps are
or should be required by section 11.
The four principal cases discussed above make two things clear. First, un-
derwriters may not simply rely upon management's assurances or content them-
selves with reading documents prepared by the issuer. Second, their
investigation must be thorough, but judges are prepared to take into account
some or all of the circumstances surrounding the offering.
IV. Integration of Disclosure Requirements of the Federal Securities Laws
and Evolution of the Disclosure Environment
The Division of Corporation Finance of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission has devoted substantial resources to the task of formulating, through
rulemaking, a single disclosure system compatible with both the transaction-
based disclosures called for by the Securities Act and the continuous corporate
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act. The creation of this system of inte-
grated disclosure is the culminating phase of a reorientation process initiated by
the Commission's Disclosure Policy Study (the Wheat Report) over a decade
ago174 and first given concrete form by the Commission's Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure.t75 From these initiatives and an ongoing dialogue among
professionals, 17 6 a consensus has developed supporting the concept of an inte-
grated disclosure system.
Prior to these developments, the disclosure systems of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act operated independently of each other, despite the fact that
each contained similar disclosure requirements. Issuers, underwriters, account-
ants and other professionals spent several weeks preparing the lengthy registra-
tion statement, including the prospectus required to be provided to investors in
connection with new offerings registered under the Securities Act, even though
some of the information contained therein might have been disclosed earlier in
one of the issuer's periodic reports filed pursuant to the Exchange Act and thus
already available to the securities markets. The issuer, its accountants and per-
haps its outside counsel prepared the periodic reports filed under the Exchange
Act; representatives of the issuer's traditional underwriters were of course not
involved. In 1966, Milton Cohen observed that the legislative history of the se-
curities acts helped explain this lack of cohesion. The disclosure scheme would
174 The Commission's staff, after an extensive reexamination of the disclosure policy under the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, called for "closer coordination of the disclosures required by" the two Acts.
1 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS 13 (1969) (Wheat Report).
175 1 REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE S.E.C., 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 420-69 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter ADVISORY COMM. REP.].
176 See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1340 (1966).
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have been better, he wrote, if the two stafutes "had been enacted in opposite
order, or had been enacted as a single, integrated scheme of continuous disclo-
sures covering issues of actively traded securities and the question of special dis-
closure in connection with public offerings had then been faced in this
setting."' 77
The Commission has taken several steps to reduce the overlap and duplica-
tion under the two statutes. The adoption of registration Form S-7 in 1967178
was the first recognition by the Commission that information reported under the
Exchange Act could substitute for some of the information previously required to
be separately disclosed in a registration statement. Use of this somewhat short-
ened form of registration was limited to issuers with a substantial history of re-
porting under the Exchange Act and hence to companies for which considerable
information was already available to potential investors. 179 In addition, pursu-
ant to a recommendation of the Commission's Disclosure Policy Study, the Com-
mission adopted an even shorter form of registration, Form S-16. °8 0 When an
issuer qualified for use of Form S-7, it could utilize Form S-16 to register securi-
ties to be sold in certain secondary distributions by the issuer's shareholders.'"'
In 1978, in a major step, use of Form S-16 was expanded to apply to certain
primary offerings that are underwritten on a firm commitment basis.' 8 2 Form S-
16 incorporates into the registration statement corporate reports previously filed
pursuant to the requirements of the Exchange Act. As a result, the prospectus is
substantially shorter and can be prepared in far less time. For example, the Form
S-16 prospectus dated March 20, 1981 of Security Pacific Corporation relating to
a sale of $100,000,000 of convertible subordinated debentures is fourteen pages
long. If the offering had been on the traditional Form S-1, it would have been at
least six times as long.
While the adoption of Forms S-7 and S-16 was an important step toward
coordinating disclosure requirements, 183 the use of these forms has been limited
to a small portion of all reporting companies. The Commission's present integra-
177 Id. at 1241.
178 Securities Act Release No. 4886 (Nov. 29, 1967), [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,500.
179 Securities Act Release No. 4849 (Nov. 16, 1966), [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 77,415.
180 17 C.F.R. § 239.27 (1980).
181 Only issuers may register securities under the Securities Act. Thus, if affiliates need to have their
shares registered for resale the issuer must cooperate and file the registration statement, for which it has
absolute liability but under which it receives none of the proceeds. The short form was adopted to reduce
the burdens on companies and to make it less likely that they would resist registering the shares where
necessary.
182 The form can be used for offerings to the public of debt or equity securities by (1) issuers with a
specified market capitalization, or (2) issuers whose parents meet this requirement and who offer debt
securities which are guaranteed as to principal and interest by the parent, provided the offering is made
pursuant to firm commitment underwriting. Any debt securities must be issued pursuant to a trust inden-
ture qualified under the Trust Indenture Act of 1939. The form can also be used for offerings to existing
security holders pursuant to rights offerings or to dividend or interest reinvestment plans, or for offerings to
holders of convertible securities or transferable warrants under certain circumstances. Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5923 (Apr. 10, 1978), 43 Fed. Reg. 16,672 (1978).
183 The Commission has taken other preliminary steps to coordinate disclosure requirements. Se Se-
curities Act Release No. 5276 (July 26, 1972) (announcing changes in registration Forms S-1 and S-2
modeled on Forms 10 and 10-K); Securities Act Release No. 5395 (June 1, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,383; Securities Act Release No. 5758 (Nov. 2, 1976), [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,783.
[June 1981]
INVESTMENT BANKERS
tion project is comprehensive in scope and is designed to benefit all companies
which have been reporting for at least three years. The integration project is
based on two important premises.
First, there is little justification for requiring redundant disclosure by com-
panies that are closely followed by securities analysts and institutional and other
professional investors.18 4 For this group of companies, the market appears to
assimilate available company-specific information in a timely manner and mar-
ket prices quickly reflect such information.1 8 5 The Commission staff has been
unable to detect any appreciable incremental benefit from requiring such compa-
nies to prepare registration statements which reproduce much of the same infor-
mation that has already appeared in periodic reports filed with the Commission
pursuant to the Exchange Act. 186
Second, redundant disclosure requirements burden business and conceiva-
bly could slow down the process of capital formation because of the time neces-
sary to prepare lengthy registration statements containing the repetitive
disclosures.18 7 The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure found that
[a] continuous, coordinated and integrated disclosure system for industrial issuers re-
quired to file information under the 1933 and 1934 Acts will curtail registration costs
and administrative obstacles incurred by industrial issuers in raising capital, facilitate
timely access to the capital markets, and simplify the exchange offer and business
combination processes.'
8 8
Under both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the Commission has
broad discretion to prescribe the information that companies must set forth in
registration statements19 and in periodic corporate reports.1 90 The Commis-
sion's initiatives in 1980 approached the goal of integrating the two Acts' disclo-
sure requirements by identifying a basic information package, primarily
financial, which is material both to investors trading the securities of issuers regis-
184 Research by the Advisory Committee on Disclosure Policy revealed that less than 1,000 issuers out
of the more than 10,000 which file periodic reports pursuant to the Exchange Act are followed by one or
more analysts at any given time. ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 175, at xvIiI-xix.
185 See, e.g., Beaver, The Information Content of Annual Earnings Announcements, EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN
ACCOUNTING: SELECTED STUD. 67, 90 (1968); Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjusitment of Stock Prices to
New Information, 10 INT'L ECON. REV. 1, 17-18 (1969); Scholes, The Market For Securities: Substitution Versus
Price Pressure and the Efects of Information on Share Prices, 11 J. Bus. 179, 203 (1972). Summarizing the
findings of a number of studies, Tinic and West report that "the results thus far are generally consistent
with the hypothesis that publicly available information tends to be impounded very quickly and, on the
average, in an unbiased fashion." S. TINIC & R. WEST, INVESTING IN SECURITIES: AN EFFICIENT MAR-
KET APPROACH 508 (1979).
Naturally, companies have the option of including more disclosure than is required in the Form S-16
prospectus. This often happens with equity offerings. Although the market may have assimilated the
information, the new purchaser may still have to be sold on the deal.
186 This does not presume that the previously fumished information is necessarily accurate. In this
regard see discussion in text accompanying notes 250 & 266-70 infra.
187 There has been some criticism of the Commission's reporting requirements in this regard. See, e.g.,
J. GREENE, REGULATORY PROBLEMS AND REGULATORY REFORM: THE PERCEPTIONS OF BUSINESS 12
(1980).
188 ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 175, at 425.
189 Securities Act, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (g) (1976) authorizes the Commission to waive statutorily im-
posed disclosure requirements if there still will be "disclosure fully adequate for the protection of investors"
and to require additional disclosures in the registration statement which are "necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors."
190 Exchange Act, § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (1976) grants the Commission similar authority, and under
that section the Commission requires issuers to file annual reports on Form 10-K and interim reports on
Form 10-Q or Form 8-K.
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tered under the Exchange Act and to persons considering whether to invest in
securities offered pursuant to the Securities Act. It was determined that such a
basic information package should consist of (1) audited financial statements
(comprised of balance sheets issued at the end of the two most recent fiscal years,
and income and source and application of funds statements for the three most
recent fiscal years, all prepared on a consolidated basis), (2) a five year summary
of financial data appropriate for trend analysis, and (3) management's discussion
and analysis of the company's financial condition, including liquidity, capital
resources and the impact of inflation.
The disclosure requirements relating to this basic package of financial infor-
mation are set forth in Regulation S-K' 9 ' and Regulation S-X. t9 2 The basic
financial information package will be disclosed, in the Exchange Act context, in
Part II of the issuer's annual report on Form 10-K or in its annual report to
security holders which can, in turn, be incorporated by reference into the Form
10-K.
193
Under the integrated disclosure system, it is proposed that issuers be divided
into three tiers. 9 4 An issuer's classification will determine what information
must be set forth directly in the prospectus or otherwise delivered to investors
and the extent to which previously disseminated information can be incorporated
by reference, in lieu of actual presentation in the prospectus or delivery to inves-
tors.
New proposed registration Forms A, B, and C are designed to respond to the
disclosure needs of investors with respect to these three categories of issuers.'
9 5
Each of the proposed forms would, by cross reference to items in Regulation S-K,
generate the same basic package of information described above, supplemented
by such other information as may be necessary or appropriate for the protection
of investors.
Proposed Form A would be available for use by the top tier of issuers. As
proposed, it employs the same qualifications and would be used for the same
primary and secondary offerings as existing Form S- 16 .196 Much of the basic
191 See generl'ly Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981). Regulation S-
K eventually also will be the repository of all general disclosure requirements under the Securities Act.
Securities Act Release No. 5949 (July 28, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,649.
192 Securities Act Release No. 6178 (Jan. 15, 1980), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,424.
193 Securities Act Release No. 6231 (Sept. 2, 1980), [19811 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,301.
194 Id.
195 Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980).
196 As proposed, use of the form would be subject to the following conditions among others:
(1) It could be used only by an issuer with a class of securities registered pursuant to § 12(b) of
the Exchange Act or by a domestic issuer with a class of equity securities registered under
§ 12(g);
(2) The issuer must have been subject to and in compliance with the periodic reporting re-
quirements of the Exchange Act for at least the 36 months preceding the filing of the
registration statement, including timely filing of all reports during the preceding 12
months. If the issuer is subject only to § 15(d) of the Exchange Act, it must have distrib-
uted an annual report within the previous 12 months to all security holders of each class to
which the registration statement related;
(3) During the previous 36 months, the issuer must not have failed to pay any required divi-
dend or sinking fund installment on preferred stock or have defaulted on material indebt-
edness or rental on a material long-term lease;
(4) The issuer and its subsidiaries must have consolidated net income of at least $250,000 for
three of the previous four years, including the most recent fiscal year; and
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package of financial information would be incorporated by reference from the
issuer's Form 10-K or other corporate reports filed pursuant to sections 13(a) or
15(d) of the Exchange Act. The prospectus would notify potential investors how
to obtain without charge the documents incorporated by reference. Form A as
proposed would be available for use only in primary offerings that are underwrit-
ten on either a firm commitment or best efforts basis.
1 97
Proposed Form B would be available for the registration of securities offered
by the middle tier of issuers lacking the market characteristics of those companies
eligible to use Form A. The conditions for use of the form are modeled after
those for existing Form S-7. In most respects the conditions are identical to those
for Form A 198 except that instead of Form A's net income requirement, issuers
would be eligible to use the form if they did not possess any of certain specified
financial characteristics. 199 Much of the information required by Form B is the
(5) With respect to primary offerings,
(a) the aggregate market value of the voting stock held by nonaffiliates must be $50
million or more;
(b) the aggregate market value of the voting stock of the issuer's parent held by nonaf-
filiates must be $50 million or more, the issuer must be a majority-owned subsidiary
and its parent must have fully guaranteed the securities as to principal and interest;
or
(c) the aggregate market value of voting stock of the issuer's parent held by nonaffiliates
must be $50 million or more, the issuer must be a majority owned subsidiary and
(i) $250 million of registered securities outstanding must be held by
nonaffiliates and
(ii) the issuer must have 1,000 shareholders to whom it furnishes an annual
report with the financial statements prescribed by rule 14a-3.
45 Fed. Reg. at 63,709.
197 This limitation is similar to the restriction of Form S-16 to firm commitment offerings, and is based
on the Commission's belief that "the presence of an underwriter who has a degree of responsibility for an
offering serves to enhance the likelihood that investor protection will not suffer because of abbreviated
disclosure in the prospectus." Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,700
(1980). That is to say, the underwriter will have reviewed and verified to the extent necessary the docu-
ments incorporated. However, the logic of such restriction is questionable. The form is predicated upon
the nature of the market for a company's securities and reduces the need to reiterate prior disclosure
because of its ready availability. Yet why should a company have to reiterate the disclosure when it self-
underwrites or engages in a best efforts offering? Repetition does not guarantee accuracy, and since the
information is incorporated by reference, it is subject to § I I standards. The limitation to firm commit-
ment underwritings was probably the product of an abundance of caution. However, logic dictates that if
the issuer qualifies, it should be able to issue any type of security in any manner it wishes. If an under-
writer is used, of course, it will have to conduct an investigation into the business of the issuer, a process
separate from the preparation of the short-form registration statement. Moreover, if underwriters are
correct in believing that reduced preparation time compels curtailed investigation, then perhaps the short
form should not be available for the type of offerings that necessitate a firm commitment underwriting; the
parties should be required to prepare a long-form prospectus. That would mean issuers would have to
incur unnecessary expense to allow underwriters to verify information that issuers are absolutely liable for
and with respect to which directors are comfortable that they can show they have conducted the reason-
able investigation necessary to avoid liability. In addition, if the form is premised upon an efficient mar-
ket, it is not clear whether all the criteria are logical. For example, a company like General Motors could
not use the form for a debt or equity offering because it had a loss in its last fiscal year, yet certainly the
company is widely followed. Thus, the staff is examining thoroughly the question of appropriate criteria.
198 The conditions for the use of Form A are set forth in note 196 supra.
199 The characteristics proposed were:
(1) a decline of more than 50% in income from continuing operations over the last fiscal year;
(2) any material financial uncertainty which has or will result in a "subject to" opinion in the
accountant's report; or
(3) a downgraded bond rating during the previous 12 months.
45 Fed. Reg. at 63,701. Commentators have been severely critical of conditioning eligibility to use a form
on specified financial criteria. They argue persuasively that while the existence of such characteristics
might warrant additional disclosure or greater review, it should not deprive companies of the benefits of
the form. Moreover, there is little agreement as to which of a company's financial characteristics mean the
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same as that required by Form A. The major difference is that most required
information in Form B must be delivered to potential investors rather than sim-
ply incorporated by reference into the prospectus. The requirements could be met
either by presenting the information in the prospectus directly or by delivering to
security holders a copy of the issuer's previously prepared annual report and,
where applicable, the issuer's latest Form 10-Q. Another distinction between the
two forms is that offerings made pursuant to Form B need not be underwritten.
Thus, although information must be delivered, previously prepared documents
can be used, thereby reducing the time necessary to prepare the prospectus. To
make those materials part of the registration statement, the relevant portions would
be incorporated by reference.
Proposed Form C would be used by issuers who either do not qualify to use
or choose not to use any other Securities Act registration form. It is also the only
form, other than Forms S-15 and S-14, which could be used to register securities
to be issued in an exchange offer for securities of another person. Form C, as the
basic full form for registering securities under the Securities Act, would be a
streamlined version of existing Form S-I. The core financial information would
be the same as that required in Forms A and B. Additional disclosure items
would derive from items required by Regulation S-K. There would be only min-
imal incorporation by reference.
There have been several other changes in the Commission's registration
forms as part of the integration program. The Commission has adopted a new
experimental short form of registration statement, Form S-15, for offerings of se-
curities to be issued in certain business combination transactions.20 0 Specifically,
its use is limited to registration of securities for issuance in rule 145(a) (1) transac-
tions, 20 1 short-form mergers, and exchange offers to acquire a majority of a class
of securities of another person where the acquisition will have less than a ten
percent consolidated pro forma effect on the issuer. Form S-15 allows issuers
meeting the conditions for its use202 to furnish shareholders of the company to be
acquired with the issuer's basic package of financial information by delivering its
latest annual report to security holders along with the prospectus. The prospec-
tus contains only disclosures about the proposed business combination transac-
tion, the company being acquired, and any additional information necessary to
update information contained in the annual report to security holders.
Finally, the Commission has proposed rule 462A,20 3 which would permit the
"shelf" registration20 4 of securities that can reasonably be expected to be offered
company is troubled, and it would be inappropriate for the Commission to characterize a company
through a form as financially troubled.
200 Adoption of Form S-15 was announced in Securities Act Release No. 6232 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed.
Reg. 63,647 (1980).
201 Rule 145(a)(1) transactions are reclassifications of securities, other than stock splits, reverse stock
splits, or changes in par value, which involve the substitution of one security for another security.
202 The five conditions which must be met are set forth as General Instruction A to Form S-15, 45 Fed.
Reg. 63,647, 63,655 (1980) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 239.29).
203 Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981).
204 "Shelf" registration occurs when an issuer registers securities "for the shelf," ie., when it does not
plan to offer the securities immediately upon the effectiveness of the registration statement. The last sen-
tence of§ 6(a) of the Securities Act provides: "A registration statement shall be deemed effective only as to
the securities specified therein as proposed to be offered." 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a) (1976). Guide 4 of The
Guides for the Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements and Periodic Reports, as originally
adopted in Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
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and sold within two years provided adequate current information is made avail-
able to investors by means of post-effective amendments. 20 5 The proposed rule
would restrict shelf registration to certain types of offerings. 20 6 With respect to
such offerings, the Commission has stated: "Shelf registration can utilize integra-
tion effectively, thereby facilitating the development of important new capital
raising techniques. Accordingly, the Commission believes that a restrictive pol-
icy on shelf registration is not appropriate or necessary for the protection of inves-
tors."
2 0 7
The elements of the evolving streamlined, integrated disclosure system ac-
quire practical meaning in the context of the securities offering and distribution
process.
V. The Stock Offering Process Under the Integrated Disclosure System
A. The Efects of Integration on the Ofeing Process
The Commission's integration program affects the offering process in three
major ways that impact upon the activities and responsibilities of underwriters.
First, integration reduces the time necessary to prepare registration statements,
(CCH) 77,636, interprets that provision of§ 6(a) to prohibit the registration of securities for a delayed or
postponed offering. The guide does, however, cite instances in which such registration has been permit-
ted-for example, where the registrant proposed to engage in a continuing acquisition program. In Secur-
ities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981) (the "Shelf Release"), the Commission
proposed to drop the guide and replace it with rule 462A to be added to Regulation C because the guide
no longer reflects current staff policies and its interpretation of § 6(a) may be too restrictive. In the ab-
sence of any specific legislative comment, early opinions of the Commission and its staff interpreted the last
sentence of § 6(a) as requiring that the registration statement be effective only as to securities to be offered
in "the proximate future." The general prohibition against shelf registration was designed to effectuate
the policy of the last sentence of § 6(a) that registration statements provide current information. This
interpretation was in turn based on the assumption that securities offered at some remote future time gave
the appearance of registered status without providing accurate and current information. Shelf Release at
87.
In practice, the Commission did not absolutely bar shelf registrations. Recognizing that the early
interpretations were based in large part on concerns about the currency of information, the Commission
and its staff developed, by changes in rules and practice, more effective means-particularly through post-
effective amendments and undertakings-for updating and assuring the adequacy of disclosure. Because
the statutory terminology "proposed to be offered" has no specific time frame, it has been considered
reasonable to take into account (in the proposed rule 462A) the availability of adequate information under
an integrated disclosure system in administering agency policy with respect to shelf registration.
205 Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg. 78 (1981).
206 The proposed rule provides in part:
(a) A registration statement may be declared effective for an offering of securities to be made
on a continuous or delayed basis in the future, provided that
(1) The registration statement pertains to:
(i) Securities in an amount which can reasonably be expected to be offered and
sold within two years from the effective date of the initial registration state-
ment; or
(ii) Securities which are reasonably expected to be offered and sold pursuant to
dividend or interest reinvestment plans or employee benefit plans of the regis-
trant; or
(iii) Securities which (A) are the subject of exercisable options, warrants or rights
which are, or within two years from the effective date of the initial registration
statement will be, exercisable, or (B) are issuable upon conversion of other se-
curities, if such other securities are also registered on the effective date, or (C)
are pledged as collateral.
46 Fed. Reg. at 87-88 (1981). The remainder of the proposed rule requires that registrants undertake to
keep the information in the registration statement current by several specified means. If the rule is
adopted, issuers could for the first time register equity and debt securities for a continuous offering "at-the-
market" or otherwise.
207 46 Fed. Reg. at 88.
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thereby eliminating artificial barriers to the speed with which an offering may be
accomplished if everything else has been done. Second, it places special emphasis
on periodic reports often composed by persons divorced from the underwriters.
Third, for unrelated reasons, it has been accompanied by more rapid processing
of registration statements by the Commission staff. The integration program is
designed to benefit issuers; it does not purport to change the critical role played
by underwriters in the process of distributing securities. The issue, however, is:
Has it had unintended effects for which the Commission should accept responsi-
bility?
Historically, the offering process began several months before the proposed
effective date of the registration statement. This preparation period was needed
to allow the underwriter, the issuer and counsel sufficient time to gather the ex-
tensive information needed to write the prospectus. After filing, there was usu-
ally a significant time period during which the Commission staff reviewed and
commented on the filing. Underwriters would almost always have completed
their investigation before filing.
20 8
Under the evolving integrated disclosure system, parties will need to prepare
considerably less material in connection with the offering. Registration Forms S-
16 and S-15 and proposed Form A and (to a lesser extent) Form B rely to the
extent possible on previously filed periodic reports or the issuer's annual report to
security holders, which would be incorporated by reference into the pertinent
registration form. Only minimal additional information, primarily related to
describing the proposed transactions and updating previously filed information,
would need to be prepared in connection with filing the registration statement.
These changes will shorten significantly the preparation period that precedes the
filing of a registration statement with the Commission. This puts added pressure
on underwriters to complete their investigation before filing. If that is the case,
why not complete due diligence while the Commission is processing the filing?
First, underwriters are reluctant to do that, because a preliminary prospectus is
circulating during that process. 20 9 Second, processing time is being drastically
reduced, in part because of a reduction of resources in the Division of Corporate
Finance.
The Securities Act provides that the effective date of a registration statement
shall be the twentieth day after the filing date, and that amendments to the regis-
tration statement reactivate the twenty day "waiting" period.2 10 The purpose of
this delay period, according to the Conference Committee on the Securities Act,
is to allow time for "public scrutiny" of the proposed offering.2 1 1 The Commis-
208 See note 209 infia.
209 Technically, under the Securities Act no prospectus need be given the purchaser before he receives
his confirmation of purchase, since oral offers are permitted under § 5 before the registration statement
becomes effective. The Commission, however, has encouraged prior distribution of preliminary prospec-
tuses to prospective purchasers to enable them to assess their investment. The Commission takes into
account such prior distribution when granting requests for acceleration. See rule 460, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460
(1980). Any material changes in disclosure resulting from any investigation would require recirculation
before acceleration would be granted. The number of preliminary prospectuses distributed varies widely,
from as few as 1,000 to more than 15,000, depending on the nature of the offering. One can therefore
appreciate the cost savings to an issuer inherent in a Form S-16, and the reluctance of underwriters to file
before due diligence is substantially complete.
210 Securities Act, § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a) (1976).
211 H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1933).
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sion may, at its discretion, "accelerate" the effectiveness date upon request. 21 2
Because traditional long-form registrations are amended, sometimes several
times, in response to comments by the Commission's staff, in practice the period
between filing and effectiveness has often been as long as forty-five to ninety
days.
In the future, however, there may be considerable shortening of this waiting
period. The volatility of the markets21 3 has led issuers and counsel routinely to
request acceleration of effectiveness shortly after filing. Processing time for Form
S- 16 registration statements has been drastically reduced to a few days, r6r to only
forty-eight hours in some cases of debt offerings, because of the volatility of the
bond markets.
2 14
The staff has honored such acceleration requests because the Division of
Corporate Finance is simply not able to review in detail all filings made with it
and, as a result, must leave the decision as to the appropriate effective date to the
issuer and underwriter. Selective review procedures are now in place in the Divi-
sion. While the staff probably will continue to review thoroughly first-time regis-
tration statements, "going private" transaction statements, 2 15 and registration
statements of financially troubled companies, other filings will be reviewed on a
selective basis, and those not reviewed will become effective on the date requested
by the issuer and underwriter.
The decision not to review thoroughly every registration statement was
based primarily on the enormous processing and review burdens placed upon the
Commission's comparatively small staff. In 1940, the size of the staff was
1,670.216 During the intervening forty years, the Commission staff has increased
212 17 C.F.R. § 230.461 (1980).
213 The following data submitted by Morgan Stanley & Co. as part of its Comment letter on proposed
Forms A, B and C illustrates the increasingly wide fluctuations in interest rates which could substantially
increase the risks associated with undewriting debt offerings in particular:
20 Year Treasury Notes Weekly Percentage Yields
Range Standard
Year High Low High-Low Mean Median Deviation
1971 6.51 5.73 0.78 6.13 6.09 0.21
1972 6.19 5.74 0.45 6.01 6.01 0.10
1973 7.79 6.42 1.37 7.12 7.07 0.26
1974 8.68 7.40 1.28 8.06 8.08 0.37
1975 8.63 7.63 1.00 8.19 8.22 0.26
1976 8.17 7.28 0.89 7.87 7.94 0.21
1977 7.92 7.23 0.69 7.66 7.68 0.12
1978 9.00 8.01 0.99 8.48 8.47 0.24
1979 10.56 8.79 1.77 9.33 9.08 0.53
1980* 12.79 9.59 3.20 11.10 10.97 0.89
* Information through third quarter only.
Morgan Stanley & Co. letter (Jan. 14, 1981) (File No. S7-763).
214 During the period from October 1979 to June 1980 there were 249 Form S-16 offerings. 22.4%
became effective within one week of filing and 38.8% became effective within between one and two weeks.
For a statistical profile of Form S-16 issuers and offerings, see Securities Act Release No. 6235A (Oct. 15,
1980), [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,665.
215 SEC Press Release (Nov. 17, 1980), reprinted in 2 PRACTICING LAW INSTrrUTE, PREPARATION OF
ANNUAL DIscLosuRE DOCUMENTS 1981, 33.
216 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 102 (1940).
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by only twenty percent 217 while the number of reporting companies has tripled,
and the number and complexity of filings has increased enormously.2 1 8 Another
consideration is the increasing volatility of the market, which shortens the period
during which market conditions are optimal for offering an issue of securities.
Any review of a selected filing must be done within a time framework sensitive to
market conditions. Three months processing time is not acceptable. It can be
anticipated that there will be substantial pressure to accelerate the effective dates
or to shorten processing time of the new proposed registration forms for the same
reasons.
In soliciting public comment on proposed Form A, the Commission specifi-
cally invited comment regarding whether there should be a minimum time pe-
riod between filing and effectiveness of a registration statement on Form A.
21 9
With respect to the responsibilities of underwriters, the commentators indicated
that underwriters usually conclude their investigation prior to the filing of the
registration statement.220 Therefore, even though registration statements be-
come effective very soon after filing, there should be no effect upon the adequacy
of the underwriter's investigation, assuming there has been adequate time for
investigation prior to filing.
221
A viable integrated disclosure system will depend, in part, upon upgrading
and maintaining the quality of Exchange Act filings.222 Toward this end, some
of the saved staff time resulting from selective review of Securities Act registra-
tion statements will be shifted to more intensive review of Exchange Act filings,
with examination focusing on the portions of filings that could be incorporated
by reference into registration statements.
223
217 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 65 (1979).
218 For example, in 1962 the Division received 18,000 filings under the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act. There were 55,000 such filings in 1980.
219 45 Fed. Reg. 63,700 (1980).
220 See Comment letter of the Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers (Jan. 30, 1981) at 2 ("In our experience, an
underwriter substantially completes the due diligence investigation in connection with an offering prior to
the time that the registration statement is filed, and not during the period between filing and effectiveness.
The brevity of the latter period should not, therefore, be a factor in determining the thoroughness with
which due diligence is performed."). See also Comment letter of AT&T Co. (Jan. 15, 1981) at 6 (File No.
S7-849) ("our experience is that most underwriters satisfy .. their due diligence obligations prior to the
initial filing of the registration statement").
221 It should be noted, however, that since § 11 liability arises from omissions or misstatements in the
registration statement "when it became effective," any delay in effectiveness requires that the underwriters
continue to be vigilant with respect to late-breaking material developments which should be added to the
registration statement by means of an amendment. Sec Securities Act Release No. 5180 (Aug. 16, 1971), 36
Fed. Reg. 16,506 (1971).
222 See Securities Act Release No. 6176 (Jan. 15, 1980), [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) $ 82,422 (enhanced quality of disclosure in the Form 10-K and in shareholder reports will be
necessary if the integration of disclosure under the Securities Act and Exchange Act is to be achieved in a
successful manner). To help maintain the quality of disclosure, the Commission now requires the Form
10-K to be signed by a majority of an issuer's directors. Id. at 82,766.
223 As reporting under the Securities Act and Exchange Act is integrated, careful disclosure oversight
of periodic reports has to be assured. Such oversight should not necessarily be triggered solely by a Securi-
ties Act filing incorporating a periodic report by reference. In fact, most companies reporting under the
Exchange Act do not necessarily finance each year, yet the market trades back and forth in great volume
based in part upon the presumed accuracy of periodic information. It has been estimated that the dollar
value of equity securities traded in the United States secondary markets in 1979 was about $345 billion,
with the comparable figure for corporate debt securities far higher. In contrast, the dollar value of equity
and debt sold in underwritten public offet;ings in 1979 was about $36 billion. Comment letter of Securities
Industry Association (Feb. 18, 1981) at 4 (File No. S7-849). To shift to review of periodic reports creates a
dilemma for the Commission staff because resources already are heavily taxed; yet there are far more
periodic reports filed than registration statements. In 1980, for example, 3,299 registration statements were
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B. The Eflcts of Increased Competitiveness in the Underwriting of Securities Ojfrings
In the past, a key characteristic of the investment banking business was the
tradition of issuers maintaining long term relationships with the same principal
underwriter or underwriters.2 24 Indeed, the ties between issuers and particular
underwriters were allegedly so strong at one point that the Department of Justice
sued seventeen investment banking firms for conspiracy to monopolize the securi-
ties business. The district court's decision in United States v. Morgan225 rejected
these allegations. The court found that, while underwriters competed vigorously
for business, there were good reasons why continuing business relationships ex-
isted:
In every business the customer feels that there are cogent reasons why he should
continue with the firm which has rendered good service in the past. But with a series
of security issues, the saving in the time and labor of the officers and employees of an
issuer, which would have to be spent in teaching a new investment banker the intri-
cacies of the Gusiness, and the financial set up of the company, are a matter of real
consequence; and it must not be forgotten that many of the matters to be discussed
are of such a character that company officials desire to have such conversations only
with those whom they trust, and in whose integrity and competence they have com-
plete confidence.
2 26
Such continuing relationships no doubt simplify underwriters' reasonable investi-
gation of the information contained in registration statements, since the invest-
ment banker's ever increasing familiarity with particular issuers should make
each successive investigation both more efficient and more fruitful.
Long term underwriting relationships were disrupted to some extent by the
Commission's adoption of rule U-50 in 1941.227 The rule requires subject public
utility holding companies and their subsidiaries to publicly invite sealed, written
proposals for the purchase or underwriting of securities covered by the rule. The
introduction of competitive bidding has affected the underwriters' relationship
with these issuers in several ways. For one thing, there no longer is assurance of a
continuing relationship between issuer and underwriter, unless the underwriter
happens consistently to submit the best bid. Moreover, since the bidding propos-
als address the terms of the offering, competitive bidding requires underwriters to
make judgments about the issuer's financial condition and financing needs with-
filed, of which 601 involved initial public offerings by previously non-reporting companies, and which
hence were given a full review. This represented a substantial increase from 1979, when 2,560 registration
statements were filed, of which 480 were initial public offerings. Even with this increase, the number of
registration statements filed in 1980 is far less than the approximately 8,000 Forms 10-K filed in that year.
Therefore, it will be necessary to establish a system for selectively reviewing periodic reports as well as
registration statements.
224 One indication of such ties was the common practice of putting the investment banker on the
issuer's board of directors. Some investment banking firms requested and received board seats because, so
the argument goes, their presence helped insure that the company was mariaged in a manner that pro-
tected the interests of the investors to whom the investment bankers had sold the issuer's securities. See,
e.g., United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). This practice has been criticized
because of the potential conflicts of interest associated with the investment banker serving as a director,
and there has been a substantial reduction in the number of investment bankers sitting on their clients'
boards. See generalo SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REPORT ON
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 310-15 (Comm. Print 1980); ERNST & ERNST, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
DISCLOSURE: 1978 SURVEY (1978).
225 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
226 Id. at 817.
227 17 C.F.R. § 250.50 (1941) (current version at 17 C.F.R. § 250.50 (1981)).
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out benefit of the preliminary discussions that previously occurred during the
"origination" phase of planning for external financing.
The chief complaint against competitive bidding, however, concerns its ef-
fects on the civil liabilities of the Securities Act. In an illuminating discussion of
the securities distribution process, two commentators stated:
Although the successful underwriting group must still assume all the civil liabilities
imposed upon underwriters by the 1933 Act, their opportunities to make the investi-
gation, which normally precedes their assumption of such liabilities, has been greatly
curtailed by the practical impossibility of conducting such investigations without any
assurance of ultimately getting the business.
228
Perhaps the most detrimental effect of competitive bidding is that the investiga-
tion by bidders' counsel, who is not liable under section 11, is not supervised by
the bidding underwriters who are liable.229 The independent counsel appointed
by the issuer may not entirely substitute for the underwriter's active involvement.
As a partner for Salomon Brothers, who addressed the quality of disclosure in
competitively bid utility issues, testified in hearings sponsored by the Commis-
sion: "The competitive bidding process in which 'due diligence' is performed to a
large extent by counsel for the bidders appointed by the issuer has in many cases
unfortunately led to a certain 'hardening of the prospectuses.' "230 It should be
emphasized, however, that apart from regulated industries, competitive bidding
is not a widespread practice.
23 1
Another type of underwriting arrangement, the Dutch auction, was at-
tempted three years ago by Exxon Corporation with respect to an issue of pollu-
tion control bonds and an issue of municipal revenue bonds-both exempt from
registration. Under this approach the issuer invites bids which, unlike competi-
tive bids, need not cover the entire proposed issue or be submitted by a group of
underwriters. Rather, each dealer bids for the amount of securities it intends to
distribute. The issuer selects the best bids in order until all the securities are
purchased. The arrangements are made on a firm commitment basis, and all
successful bidders receive their portion of the issue based upon the terms of the
last bid accepted. In addition, unlike offerings made pursuant to a syndicate
agreement, there is no fixed spread and no fixed reoffering price.
The issuer may benefit from a Dutch auction arrangement by receiving a
higher aggregate price for the issue than it would receive with competitive bid-
ding or negotiated offerings. 232 Due to highly competitive retail pricing of such
228 Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 9, at 104.
229 One critic of this arrangement observed: "The underwriting groups, only one of which will get the
deal, have little incentive or opportunity to do an independent investigation of the issuer's operations.
They tend to rely on the issuer's bidding prospectus and registration statement, which have been prepared
in advance by the issuer and its lawyers." Wolfson, supra note 42, at 371.
230 Quoted in Wolfson, id. at 372. See generaly Hearing on Temporaqy Suspension of the Competitive Bidding
Requirements of Rule 50 with Respect to Common Stock of Holding Companies Registered Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935 (Jan. 6-9, 1975) (File No. S7-529).
231 See Welles, WallStreet's Last GoldMine, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1978, at 133: "Actual use
of competitive bidding. . . remains rather sparse-if anything, the recent overall trend has been toward
negotiated offerings. In the utility field, which accounts for a third of corporate underwritings, . . . the
tradition of competitive bidding remains well entrenched ...." During the first three quarters of 1977,
approximately 60% of all public capital financings by public utilities and 73% of long-term debt financing
was competitively bid. Id.
232 For example, Exxon contends that it saved approximately $1.9 million by employing a Dutch auc-
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securities, however, the underwriters or selling broker-dealers may lose money. 233
Under these conditions, it seems likely that the underwriter in a Dutch auction
arrangement will investigate far less extensively than it would in the case of a
negotiated offering or even a competitively bid offering.234 As one commentator
observed in 1978, "[f]ortunately for Wall Street, no other corporation has seen fit
to emulate Exxon" by utilizing a Dutch auction.235 Because of its potential ap-
peal to issuers, however, other companies may eventually experiment with this
approach.
Another source of competitive pressure on underwriters has been the availa-
bility of the Eurodollar market, which American companies increasingly tap for
offerings of debt and convertible securities.236 The ready alternative of an expe-
ditious Eurodollar offering without compliance with the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act 23 7 may heighten the pressure upon underwriters to
participate in equivalent debt offerings made on American securities markets
within the shortest possible time so as to not lose the business abroad.
The underwriting community also may be affected if the Commission
adopts proposed rule 462A, which would in all likelihood greatly expand the use
of shelf registrations of securities. Under rule 462A an issuer would file a registra-
tion with respect to securities it anticipated offering during the next two years.
When market conditions were favorable, it would file a post-effective amendment
or a supplement under rule 424(c) describing the terms of the offering. Since the
basic registration statement would have been prepared, reviewed and declared
effective previously, preparation of the post-effective amendment or supplement
would be a simple process allowing issuers-to market securities quickly.
The proposed shelf rule raises several questions bearing on the underwriter's
duty to conduct a reasonable investigation. If issuers make offerings of shelf-
registered securities solely through their traditional underwriter or underwriting
group, there should be no special difficulty.23 8 To the extent issuers do not com-
tion rather than a conventional underwriting arrangement for two bond offerings totalling $305 million.
Robertson, Future Shock at Aorgan Stanley, FORTUNE, Feb. 27, 1978, at 90.
233 Id.
234 One authority has cautioned that underwriters "will be unwilling to incur the expense of an investi-
gation if they do not have some assurance that they will get the issue." G. ROBINSON & K. EPPLER, 1
GoING PUBLIC--SECURITIES UNDERWRITING § 24 (rev. pages 1978). The same authors opine that "try-
ing to get firms to bid against each other may cause many good firms to lose interest in the issue." Id. If
the quality of the underwriters declines so may the quality of investigations.
235 Welles, supra note 231, at 134.
236 Borrowings on the Eurodollar market totalled $88.6 billion in 1980. Nine percent of this amount
was loaned to U.S. borrowers, a dramatic increase from the 1.8% of the value of all loans that were granted
to U.S. borrowers during 1979. Annual Fnancing Report at 34, supp. to Euromonql, Mar. 1981. With respect
to U.S. issuers the prospectus used in the Eurodollar market is substantially similar to the one which would
be used if the offering were here. However, the prospectus need not be filed with the Commission, is not
subject to § 11, and may be prepared so quickly that an offering may be done virtually overnight.
237 Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964). The Commission does require that certain steps be
taken to prevent flow back of securities into the United States; after the interest equalization tax expired,
the Commission restated its position in no action letters relating to Pacific Lighting Corp. (June 13, 1974)
and Singer Co. (Sept. 3, 1974).
238 It is likely that underwriters will suggest to their clients that securities be registered for the shelf, for
distribution through them in a variety of ways. In addition to sales in fixed price underwritings, securities
on the shelf might also be sold (1) in "regular way" transactions in the auction market on the floor of (for
example) the New York Stock Exchange, where the broker-dealer acts-as selling agent; (2) in sales to
various institutions by broker-dealers as agents; (3) in block transactions on an exchange in which a bro-
ker-dealer will have solicited and acted as both broker for the buyers and agent for the issuer with securi-
ties on the shelf; or (4) in fixed price offerings off the floor of an exchange, where a broker-dealer commits
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mit to make offerings through any one underwriter, they may generate competi-
tion, but since they are poised to make an offering, issuers may resist allowing
underwriters to take the time to verify the information either in the prospectus or
incorporated by reference. Underwriters worry that competitive pressures may
force them to take business risks if the shelf rule is expanded. Integration per se
does not cause this problem, but it does take away underwriters' ability to control
the preparation of the document and to verify its contents in the first instance.
The underwriters no longer have the regulatory barriers posed by preparation of
a complex prospectus, and must insist on time for verification in different con-
texts.
VI. Should There Be More Definite Guidance for Underwriters?
The changes in competitive underwriting practices, the increasing integra-
tion of disclosure requirements, and the significantly greater efficiency of today's
securities markets, taken together, raise the questions of what constitutes a "rea-
sonable" investigation in today's disclosure environment and whether the Com-
mission should attempt to identify the factors to be taken into account in
determining what is reasonable. Arguments can be marshalled both for and
against taking action at this time to clarify the extent of underwriters' responsi-
bilities under section 11.
A. Arguments Against Enunciation of a More Definite Standard of
Underwriters' Responsibilities
It can be argued that there is no need for further elaboration by rulemaking
of the standard set forth in section 11. Courts are especially adept at resolving
questions about the manner in which specific factual situations affect statutory
obligations. Moreover, the legislative history of the Securities Act makes clear
that Congress intended section 1 1's reasonable investigation and belief duty to be
construed in light of the surrounding circumstances.2 3 9 The Commission has also
expressed its belief that "a court, in determining the liability of an underwriter,
would consider all the facts and circumstances (including incorporation by refer-
ence) surrounding the underwriter's participation in the offering."'2 40 Courts
can, therefore, be expected to be sensitive to circumstances which defendants
contend have prevented them from making a more extensive investigation. To
the extent underwriters assert that such circumstances compelled them to abbre-
viate their investigation of the information contained in the registration state-
ment or to narrow the basis for concluding that a prospectus's expertised portions
to purchase from the issuer a large block and forms a group of selected dealers to participate in the resale
of the shares, with a selling concession being paid to such dealers. To the extent underwriters persuade
clients to register securities for the shelf for offerings solely through them, there is much less time pressure
with respect to completing their due diligence investigation, since it can be conducted in connection with
the initial filing. Issuers may want more flexibility, however, and therefore not commit to issue securities
through one investment banker. If an underwriter is named in the initial shelf, updating perhaps could be
done simply through a rule 424(c) prospectus; if, however, the underwriter is not named, a post-effective
amendment should perhaps be required, identifying the underwriter and the method of distribution. The
underwriter might then be required to join in the request to accelerate the effective date. See text accom-
panying note 324 infra.
239 See text accompanying notes 79-88 supra.
240 Securities Act Release No. 5998 (Nov. 17, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,761. See also text accompanying notes 144-48 supra.
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contain no material inaccuracies, the courts will decide whether they have acted
at their own peril or whether market conditions or competitive pressures are
among the circumstances contemplated by the Act.24 1 Moreover, as discussed
below, underwriters have themselves been unable to agree as to what constitutes
a reasonable investigation-a fact which suggests that a case by case approach is
more appropriate to flesh out the contours of the defense.
In addition, experience with existing short form registrations on Form S-16
may not evidence a need for further clarification. Form S-16, which has been in
use for several years, is applauded by issuers, who believe it has been highly suc-
cessful without reducing the quality of disclosure available to the market. As
discussed above,242 Form S-16 requires the incorporation by reference of the is-
suer's latest annual report on Form 10-K and all other reports subsequently filed
pursuant to sections 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act. While use of the form is
limited to firm commitment underwritings, experience reveals no increase either
in section 11 suits against underwriters or in faulty disclosure because of the re-
quirements of the form or the other circumstances surrounding S-16 offerings.
And as discussed above,243 logic suggests that the form be available for any type
of offering for a qualified issuer.
Moreover, underwriters are not compelled by any Commission action to as-
sociate themselves with offerings where the issuer is unwilling to allow time for a
reasonable investigation of the registration statement's contents. In commenting
upon the BarChrir decision, attorney Kenneth J. Bialkin provided advice which
should be as valuable to investment bankers as it is to securities lawyers:
This is a good time . . . to here highly resolve that as a profession we will not be
pushed around by circumstances, we will not be rushed by clients. We will not short
cut the standard of care both in our interests and in the interests of our clients. Per-
haps we can enter into an informal restraint of trade at this time which will demand
for the profession the right and the opportunity to practice the profession as it ought
to be practiced, the right and the opportunity to read the documents, to sit back and
think about the risks implicit in a particular business.
244
Underwriters simply should not succumb to the temptation to participate in of-
ferings, no matter how seemingly solvent the issuer may be,245 in circumstances
that deprive them of the opportunity to make a reasonable investigation. As the
court observed in BarChr's: "To require a check of matters easily verifiable is not
unreasonable. Even honest clients can make mistakes.
'246
The competitive pressures that assertedly restrict underwriters' ability to
conduct adequate investigations, while real, may be somewhat overstated. A
1976 Conference Board study of investment banking practices found that:
Two-thirds (67) of participating companies have maintained their current invest-
241 See, e.g., Shulman, supra note 89, at 251: "[R]easonable care is a plastic concept which has been
adapted to specific cases without undue hardship to defendants. It would be strange, indeed, if, in eases
under the Securities Act, human judgment of reasonableness would become warped."
242 See text accompanying notes 177-81 supra.
243 See text accompanying notes 183-88 supra.
244 Panel Discussion, supra note 123, at 623 (remarks of Kenneth J. Bialkin).
245 Surely the financial collapse of such companies as Penn Central, Franklin National, and W. T.
Grant should make investment bankers chary of underwriting offerings of large issuers without adequate
investigation.
246 Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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ment banking connections for at least the past five years (many of these associations
date back a score of years or more); the remaining one-third (33) have either changed
investment banking affiliations, added to the number of investment bankers used, or
abstained from forming any investment banking associations during the period.
24 7
However, the Conference Board study was completed before the use of Form S-
16 became prevalent.
Moreover, new practices may evolve with respect to preparation of docu-
ments incorporated by reference. Underwriters and their counsel may be re-
quested to review the documents before filing and to provide comments. 248
Alternatively, issuers may designate independent counsel (as in competitive bid-
ding) to review the documents; such counsel would advise underwriters in any
subsequent offering.
A final reason for resisting any proposal to narrow even partially the under-
writer's duty of investigation is that underwriters are better situated than anyone
else to verify an issuer's representations in the registration statement. If under-
writers are relieved of any part of their duty, the gap thus created will simply not
be filled. As Professor Ernest Folk observed in his seminal study of the BarChris
decision:
Underwriters are in a uniquely advantageous position to thoroughly investigate and
verify the facts concerning an issuer. They are professionals who frequently have
long experience in the field; indeed, they usually have more accumulated expertise
than most issuers who make one shot or intermittent offerings. Besides competence in
a specialized area, underwriters also have the staff and facilities that are needed toassume such responsibilities. 249
The need for verification by underwriters does not diminish under an integrated
disclosure system. The efficient market theories upon which the Commission's
integration program is premised demonstrate only that the securities markets
rapidly assimilate available company-specific information. These markets do
not, however, necessarily discriminate between true and false information. In
this regard, the Advisory Committee on Disclosure Policy reported:
The market price of a security reflects true information and false information with
equal efficiency, as long as the quality of the information is not itself a part of the
information in the market place. Thus, a fraudulent income statement not known to
be false, will be reflected in the market price of the security to the same extent as a
true one.
250
It may well be that adequate disclosure cannot be preserved under an integrated
disclosure system absent full participation by underwriters, and that they must
take the time necessary to complete their investigation before the registration
statement is filed, no matter how quickly it can be prepared.
B. Arguments Favoring Formulation of More Defite Cuidance for Underwriters
Nevertheless, there is strong feeling in the securities industry that the many
247 P. DAVEY, INVESTMENT BANKING ARRANGEMENTS 8 (Conference Board Report No. 681, 1976).
But for recent evidence of intense competition among some underwriters see Feinberg, Poaching is the New
Name of the Game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1980, at 37.
248 Comment letter of AT&T (Jan. 15, 1981) at 5 (File No. S7-849).
249 Folk, supra note 56, at 54.
250 ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 175, at xxxIII-xxxIv.
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changes in the disclosure environment, to which Commission actions have con-
tributed, have rendered untenable the underwriter's traditional role and respon-
sibilities in securities distributions. Citing the increasing volatility of the markets,
the trend toward incorporation of Exchange Act reports into registration state-
ments, the altered review procedures employed by the Commission's staff, the
expansion of financial disclosure requirements, and the Commission's emphasis
on removing barriers to capital formation, Joseph McLaughlin, Chairman of the
Securities Industry Association (SIA) Federal Regulation Committee, informed
the Division of Corporation Finance in the fall of 1980 that in his judgment,
these factors "have affected underwriters' opportunity to perform a 'reasonable
investigation' in connection with a registration statement," at the same time that
"others factors have combined to increase the likelihood that underwriters will
become involved in litigation. " 25' He believed, too, that the role of the under-
writer has changed in several respects:
No longer are particular underwriters identified with particular issuers to the same
degree. No longer are underwriters perceived as "sponsoring" an issuer's securities or
as issuing "statements for the public's reliance" in respect of securities offerings.
What underwriters are perceived as offering is financial advice and services in distri-
bution.
252
He concluded that "[w]hat underwriters need . . . is a role that would restore
their ability to assert the defense of a 'reasonable investigation' in the context of
public offerings as they are conducted under modern conditions."
253
For several years, the SIA has been attempting to persuade the Commission
that underwriters need and deserve relief.25 4 The gravamen of the SIA's concern,
prior to the Commission's issuance of proposed Forms A, B, and C, was the per-
ceived dilemma imposed upon underwriters by Form S-16, which has features
similar to proposed Form A and to some extent Form B. The capital markets
have benefitted from the availability of Form S-16. As one source recently ob-
served:
The S-16 has literally transformed the way U.S. corporations and their investment
bankers do business. They now can raise huge sums of money almost instantane-
ously, filing, pricing and marketing a deal in a few short days. The S-16, in fact, was
partly responsible for the record financing volume during the first half of 1980-a
total of $31.4 billion, $20.4 billion of it between April and June alone-as corpora-
tions rushed to take advantage of the recovery in the market.
2 55
However, the characteristics that make Form S-16 appealing as a financing
mechanism may be the source of potential problems for underwriters. The SIA
explained its position in a letter to the Commission in 1979:
Of all those subject to Section 11 liability, underwriters are unique in not being able
to control either the procedures or personnel for preparing these filings [incorporated
by reference] or to participate directly in the review of these documents prior to
-filing. Indeed, underwriters usually do not know in advance which registrants will
make public offerings using Form S-16 or whether they will be selected to manage the
251 Letter from Joseph McLaughlin to Edward F. Greene (Aug. 19, 1980) at 3 (File S7-849).
252 Id. at 5.
253 Id. at 6.
254 See text accompanying notes 275-77 infra.
255 The Mixed Blessing ofthe S-16, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1980, at 40.
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underwriting.
2 5 6
The SIA is not alone in this view.2 57 If in the context of short-form registration
statements issuers are able totally to dictate the timing of the offering, underwrit-
ers may be put in the unfortunate position of having to either truncate their
investigation or withdraw from participation in the offering. 258 Neither choice
would appear to serve the interests of full and fair disclosure for the protection of
investors.
2 5 9
On the other hand, it is argued that if issuers permit underwriters to investi-
gate fully offering materials, including material incorporated by reference, the
issuers might not be able to take advantage of existing "windows" in the market
and the cost of investigation might reduce the benefits otherwise provided by the
integrated system, which arise to a large extent from the substantial reduction in
printing and distribution costs. As a prominent law firm advised the Commis-
sion: "In our view, unless and until the legitimate concerns of underwriters...
are addressed, the proposals to integrate 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure docu-
ments, with the concomitant benefits to issuers and the investing public from
such integriation, will not prove successful in practice.
'260
C. The Commission s Proposals to Elimizate Extraneous Considerations Relating to
Material Incorporated by Reference into Registration Statements
The Commission has previously indicated that it was not inclined, in the
short run,2 6i to attempt to resolve this controversy. 262 In publishing for public
comment proposed Forms A, B, and C,263 the Commission did, however, include
in the proposals several provisions 26 4 intended to prevent extraneous factors from
impeding the ability of issuers, underwriters, and others to assure adequate dis-
256 Letter of the SIA to George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC Secretary (Jan. 24, 1979) at 6 (File No. S7-763).
257 See, e.g., Comment letter of the Committee on Securities Regulation, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York (Jan. 14, 1981) at 25 (File No. S7-849).
258 There often is no formal underwriting syndicate when the securities are registered pursuant to
Form S-16. Indeed, it has been observed that a dealer "often does not become involved ... until after the
registration statement is declared effective and he may have little or no opportunity to verify the informa-
tion contained in or incorporated by reference, in the registration statement." Comm. on Federal Regula-
tion of Securities, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association, Current
Issues and Developments in the Duties and Liabilities of Underwriters and Securities Dealers, 33 Bus. LAw. 335, 349
(1977) (Kenneth J. Bialkin, chairman) (remarks of Stephen R. Volk). In such situations, it is argued that
the dealer "is going to assess risk-reward, and go ahead and do the business if it makes sense from a
practical standpoint." Id. at 352 (remarks of Alan B. Levenson).
259 It is argued that if reputable houses withdrew from an offering they would be replaced by less
reputable firms.
260 Comment letter of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (Jan. 15, 1981) at 8-9 (File No. S7-849).
261 The Commission has in effect proposed a long-term solution in connection with its endorsement,
with some reservations, of§ 1
7
04(g) of ALI FED. SECURITIES CODE (1978), which clarifies what constitutes
"reasonable" investigation and belief. For a discussion of this provision see the text accompanying notes
310-16 infra.
262 Although the Commission's statutory authority would permit it to adopt standards as to due dili-
gence, the Commission has decided "to permit, in the first instance, the appropriate self-regulatory organi-
zations to establish standards of conduct for their members." Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26,
1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,011, 16,012 (1972). For a discussion of the efforts by National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers to establish standards for underwriters see the text accompanying notes 288-305 infra.
263 Securities Act Release No. 6235 (Sept. 2, 1980), 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693 (1980).
264 Similar provisions originally were proposed in 1978 as amendments to Form S-16, Securities Act
Release No. 5998 (Nov. 17, 1978), [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,761, but were not
adopted by the Commission.
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closure of all material information in the proposed forms. Specifically, the pro-
posed provisions would:
(1) deem, only for purposes of determining pursuant to section 11(a)
when an incorporated document became effective, the effective date of
documents incorporated by reference into the registration statement to
be the date of the document's initial filing with the Commission;
(2) deem a statement in a document incorporated by reference into the
registration statement not to be part of the registration statement if the
statement has been modified or superseded in the registration statement
or in subsequently filed documents which are incorporated by reference
into the registration statement; and
(3) provide that the making of a modifying or superseding statement
shall not be deemed an admission that the modified or superseded state-
ment constituted a violation of the federal securities laws.
265
The proposals were prompted by concern that, because section 11 imposes liabil-
ity for omissions or misstatements in any part of the registration statement when
that part became effective, liability could be asserted based on Exchange Act
reports which were accurate when filed but which become outdated and subse-
quently are incorporated by reference into the registration statement.
The proposals also respond to the concerns of some underwriters who fear
that issuers would be reluctant to accept recommendations to change or update
the disclosures in incorporated Exchange Act reports for fear that the revision
might be taken as an admission of a deficiency in the original filing. Such fears
perhaps originated in the court's reference in Fet v. Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp.2 66 to the fact that barely three months after terminating the tender
offer whose prospectus omitted to state the estimated amount of Reliance's sur-
plus surplus, Leasco included an estimate of the surplus surplus in a prospectus
for the sale of its own securities.2 67 While it appears that the subsequent disclo-
sure of the estimate led to the suit, the episode need not concern issuers able to
demonstrate that changed circumstances or subsequent events warrant revision
of the prior disclosure. The basic problem in Leasco was that the issuer was un-
able to prove that it had obtained any new information from Reliance or other-
wise which triggered the subsequent disclosure.
2 68
In any event, the Commission's proposed treatment of subsequent disclosure
should provide issuers with additional grounds for confidence. It certainly
should make clear to any inquiring court the Commission's belief that subse-
quently improved disclosure promotes the purposes of the federal securities acts,
and that the fact of revision should be disregarded in assessing the adequacy of
disclosures on the same subject matter contained in prior filings.269 These pro-
265 45 Fed. Reg. at 63,712, 63,715 (Item 8 of proposed Form A and Item 9 of proposed Form B).
266 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
267 Id. at 560. See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
268 Id. at 560-61.
269 The intended effect is identical to that achieved when courts exclude evidence of remedial safety
measures taken after an injury. The policy justification for this treatment was explained by the court in
Ashland Supply Co. v. Webb, 206 Ky. 184, 185-86, 266 S.W. 1086, 1086 (1924):
There are two reasons why evidence of subsequent repair should not be admitted. One is
that, while it may be necessary to subsequently repair the appliance, it does not follow from that
that the appliance was defective at the time of the accident. The other reason is that, if such
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posals do not, however, relieve underwriter's of their duty to investigate and to
establish reasonable ground for belief in the adequacy of disclosures in incorpo-
rated periodic reports as of the filing date, or of their duty to determine the ade-
quacy of disclosures in the registration statement that are necessary to update the
information contained in such previously filed reports.
270
Some commentators believe that the Commission's proposed treatment of
Exchange Act documents incorporated into the registration statement is suffi-
ciently responsive to the needs of underwriters. The National Association of Ac-
countants, for example, has stated that "[i]t would seem the Commission has
been attentive and responsible in addressing liability problems relating to incor-
porated documents relative to superseding comments."' 27' American Telephone
and Telegraph Company has opined that "the procedures outlined. . . are suffi-
cient protections for underwriters. ' 272 Other commentators, however, have
urged the Commission to provide even greater protection to underwriters.
273
VII. Alternative Approaches to Delineating Underwriters' Responsibilities
Within an Integrated Disclosure System
In spite of the Commission's proposals for alleviating several of the immedi-
ate concerns of underwriters about their section 11 liabilities under an integrated
disclosure system, there are those who would urge the Commission to go further.
Several well developed alternatives have already been put forward in recent
years, each of which deserves serious consideration.
A. The SIA s Safe Harbor Defnition of Due Diligence
It has recently been suggested that the Commission, at least with respect to
offerings in which information is incorporated into the prospectus by reference,
adopt a rule describing what underwriters must do in order to perform a reason-
able investigation and to establish a reasonable ground to believe. Meeting the
conduct standard would constitute full discharge of the underwriter's due dili-
gence duty in such circumstances. Three proposals of this nature have been
presented to the Commission in the past.
In recommending the adoption of the short registration form, the Wheat
Report proposed adoption of a rule defining the scope of investigation expected
of a broker acting as a statutory underwriter with respect to a secondary offering
on an exchange.2 74 Under this proposal, the broker would be deemed to have
made a reasonable investigation and to have had reasonable grounds to believe
in the adequacy of statements made in a registration statement, including infor-
mation incorporated by reference, if he read the registration statement and the
evidence were admitted, it would have a tendency to cause employers to omit making needed
repairs for fear that the precaution thus taken by them could be used as evidence against them.
270 The requirement to update information is set forth in Item 7(b) of proposed Form A and Item
7(a)(3) of proposed Form B.
271 Comment letter of National Association of Accountants (Jan. 14, 1981) at 4 (File No. S7-849).
272 Comment letter of AT&T (Jan. 15, 1981) at 5 (File No. S7-849). See also Comment letter of Edison
Elec. Inst. (Jan. 15, 1981) at 4.
273 See, e.g., Comment letter of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell & Petty (Jan. 15, 1981) at 5-6; Comment
letter of Morgan Stanley (Jan. 14, 1981) (File No. S7-849). See also discussion of a safe harbor rule for
underwriters, section VII.A. infra.
274 SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, DIscLOSURE TO INVESTORS 99-101, app. 111-2 (1969).
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incorporated Exchange Act disclosure documents and was not aware of any
omission or misstatement. The Commission did not act on this recommendation
because there was no short form of registration at the time it was made.
A somewhat similar but much more broadly applicable suggestion was
presented by the Securities Industry Association to the Commission in June 1978,
following its earlier submission in May 1978 of a private petition for rulemaking.
The SIA's proposed permanent rule provided that, in connection with an offering
pursuant to a registration statement on Form S-16,
an underwriter shall be deemed to have conducted a reasonable investigation and to
have reasonable ground for belief for purposes of Section 11, and to have exercised
reasonable care for purposes of Section 12(2), of the Securities Act of 1933 if the
underwriter (1) has read the registration statement, including all exhibits and docu-
ments incorporated therein by reference, (2) has discussed the registration statement
with responsible representatives of the registrant, and of any persons named therein
as an expert, and (3) after such reading and discussion, does not know of any untrue
statement of a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the
statements therein not misleading.
275
The SIA explained that the proposed rule was necessary because when the short
form of registration is used for offerings, "the time and opportunity afforded un-
derwriters to perform a reasonable investigation with respect to possibly out-of-
date information incorporated by reference will be reduced. '2 76 The Commis-
sion denied the SIA's petition, but in so doing expressed its belief that "a court, in
determining the liability of an underwriter, would consider all the facts and cir-
cumstances (including incorporation by reference) surrounding the underwriter's
participation in the offering.
'2 77
Perhaps the strongest arguments favoring a safe harbor definition of due
diligence are (1) that it would minimize differences among underwriters in the
nature of the investigation performed, and (2) that it would remove uncertainty
about possible liability. The safe harbor standards could be made as stringent as
the Commission deemed necessary for adequate protection of investors. If the
conditions were perceived as unduly strict, however, underwriters would not util-
ize the safe harbor rule, and the objective of the safe harbor approach would be
undermined.
The difficulty of striking the precise balance between too few and too exten-
sive conduct requirements for underwriters may fatally flaw the safe harbor ap-
proach. For example, the SIA's proposed safe harbor rule clearly set the
standard too low in both its comparative and its absolute terms. By holding
underwriters to the same proposed standard of care as that of mere sellers of
securities subject to the liability provisions of section 12, the proposal disregarded
the greater responsibilities statutorily imposed on underwriters. 278 As one district
court has noted, "since an underwriter's relation to the issuer is more substantial
than that of a broker-dealer and it plays a more central role in the marketing
process, somewhat more is required of an underwriter than a broker-dealer to
275 Letter of the SIA Corporate Finance Committee to the SEC (June 26, 1978) at 2.
276 Id. at 3.
277 Letter of George A. Fitzsimmons, SEC Secretary (May 25, 1978).
278 See generally the discussion of Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., section III.B.4. supra.
[Vol. 56:7551
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
discharge its obligation to the investing public., 279 Moreover, the SIA's proposal
would have permitted underwriters to rely exclusively upon issuers' representa-
tions as to the adequacy of disclosures in the periodic reports incorporated into
the registration statement and, to some extent, of disclosures required to update
the information in the previously filed periodic reports. The courts have rejected
the appropriateness of underwriters' relying exclusively on management,
8 0
whose disclosure practices characteristically may be self-serving,28' and in all
likelihood the Commission cannot reduce, by rule, the scope of the statutory term
as interpreted by the courts. Exclusive reliance on management also would pre-
clude underwriters from detecting and correcting honest but negligent treatment
of material information required to be disclosed. Moreover, since developments
occurring after the end of the latest fiscal year are considered to be especially
important in evaluating the company's future prospects, it is particularly impor-
tant that such developments be carefully reviewed and adequately disclosed.
The safe harbor approach raises several additional problems. It would be
virtually impossible for the Commission to state in advance what level of verifica-
tion by underwriters would meet the needs of investor protection in all cases.
Moreover, the underwriter's relationship with the issuer is unique, and investors,
analysts and others would likely be unable to verify disclosures in the under-
writer's stead. For these reasons there probably are better ways to respond to
calls for a long term solution to the concerns of underwriters.
B. Developing Standards of Professional Responsibility for Underwriters by Self-
Reguialo7 Organizations
Contemporary interest in formulating standards of professional conduct for
underwriters can be traced to experiences during the hot issues periods of the
securities markets.2 82 New issues of securities expected to rise rapidly in price
very soon after their issuance are said to be "hot." Broker-dealers are usually
anxious to participate as underwriters or as members of the selling groups of hot
issues, and sometimes their eagerness has exceeded their ability to discharge the
responsibilities associated with the distribution of new stock issues to the public.
The Commission's Special Study of Securities Markets, which examined the hot
issues period between 1959 and 1961, described the inconsistencies in the treat-
ment of hot issues by different underwriters:
279 University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). It
should be noted that Goldman was decided before Form S-16 was available for primary offerings. See
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1071 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 929
(1976).
280 As the BarChris court explained:
The purpose of Section II is to protect investors. To that end the underwriters are made
responsible for the truth of the prospectus. If they may escape that responsibility by taking at
face value representations made to them by the company's management, then the inclusion of
underwriters among those liable under Section 11 affords the investors no additional protection.
283 F. Supp. at 697.
281 Id. at 696.
282 One such period occurred from approximately 1959 to late 1961. Another took place during 1968
and 1969 and a third in the early 1970's. Today the securities offerings of some small high technology
issuers might be deemed hot issues. For recent discussion of hot issues, see Bettner, Penny Stocks, New Issues
are Still the Rage. Risks, Fraud Charges Don't Deter Investors, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 44; Sinisi, Penny
Stocks: Denver's New Gold Rush Fever, The Denver Post, Feb. 25, 1981, at 62-63.
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In general, some investment banking houses carefully investigated issuers whose offer-
ings they brought to the public market and registration statements reflected the me-
ticulous standards of these underwriters and the lawyers and accountants involved in
preparing them. Other underwriters, anxious to merchandise stock in public de-
mand, were lax in performing their responsibilities to investigate issuers whose securi-
ties they intended to offer to the public. Under these circumstances carelessly
prepared registration statements, if they were not corrected by the Commission's
staff, might contain serious misrepresentations about the issuer and its affairs.
28 3
In 1972, the Commission held public hearings on hot issues securities mar-
kets284 and again found that some underwriters were not conducting reasonable
investigations of new issues. 28 5 The hearings convinced the Commission that
there was a need to improve professional standards relating to the obligations of
underwriters. In a release discussing its conclusions from the public hearings, the
Commission noted that in the absence of industry-wide guidelines, the determi-
nation of what must be verified and how such verifications should be made varies
considerably among underwriters.2 8 6 Such variations may make it difficult for
responsible underwriters to determine what constitutes a reasonable investiga-
tion. The Commission stated that it had "the authority under the registration
and anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws to adopt standards as to
due diligence" but determined to permit "in the first instance, the appropriate
self-regulatory organizations to establish standards of conduct for their mem-
bers."
287
Accordingly, then Commission Chairman William J. Casey wrote the Presi-
dent of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) conveying the
Commission's request that the NASD "consider formulation and establishment
of standards for underwriters to follow" in investigating issuers.28 8 For the next
four years the NASD attempted, without success, to adopt specific standards to
guide the conduct of its members.
In 1973, the NASD proposed a Rule of Fair Practice whose stated purpose
was "the establishment of a system of regulation in the areas of underwriter in-
quiry and investigation respecting distributions of issues of securities to the pub-
lic."' 289 The proposed rule would have required managing underwriters to
establish and maintain written procedures for investigation of an issuer. It would
have further required that such procedures include sixteen specified areas of in-
quiry290 and that the principal or managing underwriter certify that an adequate
283 1 SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 554 (1963). The Study specifically found that "[s]ome of the newer underwriters that flourished
during the period covered by this study performed little or no investigation of the issuers for which they
acted as managers." Id, at 513.
284 SEC Division of Corporation Finance, In the Matter of the Hot Issues Securities Market Hearings (1972)
(File No. 4-148).
285 See Securities Act Release No. 5275 (July 26, 1972), 37 Fed. Reg. 16,011 (1972).
286 Id.
287 Id. at 16,013.
288 Letter dated July 26, 1972, at 2. The letter is reproduced as an attachment to Securities Act Re-
lease No. 5275 (July 26, 1972), [Special Edition No. 434] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 4506B.
289 NASD Notice to Members 73-17 (Mar. 14, 1973) at 1.
290 The proposal provided that investigatory procedures "shall include, but not necessarily be limited
to," the following:
(1) Review by underwriters' counsel of the issuer's corporate charter, by-laws, and corporate
minutes;
(2) Examination of the audited and unaudited financial statements of the issuer, including
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investigation had been made.2 9 1
The comments received by the NASD concerning the proposed rule were
generally adverse. A number of the commentators especially criticized the sug-
gestion that specific written procedures be established. Morgan Stanley & Co.
opined that "the problem of inadequate performance can never be solved by a
checklist. '292 In the firm's judgment, the existence of a list would nevertheless
"have fundamental consequences on the established pattern of liabilities in the
securities industry.1293 Smith, Barney & Co. wrote that "[establishment of writ-
ten procedures will open a Pandora's Box to the detriment" of underwriters.
2 94
No doubt some of the commentators were mindful that part of the problem in
BarChris was not only that underwriter's counsel had failed to review all the
documentation that Drexel, the underwriter, instructed it to examine, but also
that Drexel had accepted counsel's written report describing its investigative pro-
cedures even though such procedures fell short of those established by the under-
writer.295 In view of the extensive negative comment, the NASD withdrew the
rule proposal.
In 1975 the NASD proposed instead that its Board of Governors promulgate
a "Statement of Policy Concerning Due Diligence Requirements" designed to
stress the responsibilities and liabilities of underwriters and to emphasize the
footnotes, for the preceding ten year period or for the entire period of the issuer's exist-
ence if less than ten years;
(3) Review of all changes in auditors by the issuer within the preceding ten year period if
applicable and the reasons therefor;
(4) Review, with the issuer's auditors, of the financial statements which will appear in the
prospectus or offering circular;
(5) Review of the issuer's budgets, budgeting procedures, and order/backlog figures;
(6) Review of internal projections of the issuer, including the intended use of the proceeds of
the offering;
(7) Review of all pertinent marketing, scientific and/or engineering studies or reports con-
cerning the issuer or its products during the previous ten year period or for the term of the
issuer's existence if less than ten years;
(8) Consideration as to the necessity of third party review of appropriate portions of the
inquiry if the issuer is a promotional organization or engaged in marketing high technol-
ogy or previously unmarketed products;
(9) Investigation of the issuer's current and past relationships with banks, creditors, suppliers,
competitors and trade associations;
(10) Communication with key company officials and appropriate marketing and operating
personnel regarding the nature of the issuer's business and the role of each of the above
individuals in the business operation;
(11) Inspection of the issuer's property, plant and equipment;
(12) Examination of business protection devices and related data such as trademarks, patents,
copyrights and production obsolescence, among others;
(13) Review of available information with respect to the issuer's position within its industry;
(14) Review of pertinent management techniques, organization of management and the back-
ground of the management personnel of the issuer;
(15) Preparation and maintenance of memoranda pertaining to all meetings and/or conversa-
tions regarding the issuer held during the member's performance by it of its obligation of
adequate inquiry;
(16) Tax-Sheltered Program-In addition to the above, when considered appropriate, written
procedures relating to inquiry and investigation of tax-sheltered programs shall include
but not necessarily be limited to. . . four specified areas of review.
Id. at 9-11.
291 Id. at 12.
292 Comment letter of Morgan Stanley & Co. (Apr. 24, 1973) at I (NASD File No. 73-17).
293 Id.
294 Comment letter of Smith, Barney & Co. (Apr. 24, 1973) at 2.
295 Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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need for member firms "to insure that an adequate due diligence investigation
has been performed prior to participating in the distribution" of publicly offered
securities. 296 In place of the discredited list of procedures the proposed statement
included "specific examples of generally acceptable industry practice.
'297
Some commentators found even the Proposed Statement of Policy approach
unacceptable. For example, the SIA's Compliance Division wrote that "[t]he
standards of underwriting liability have been and are being developed by case
law and there appears to be no reason to create new liabilities for underwrit-
ers." 298 While not objecting to the concept of a Statement of Policy, the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York argued that any policy statement should
be expressly limited to negotiated, syndicated offerings because other types of
underwritten offerings, such as competitively bid or shelf registrations, restricted
underwriters' "opportunity" to investigate.
299
After incorporating many of the commentators' suggestions, 30 0 the NASD
on August 23, 1976 filed with the Commission, as required by section 19 of the
Exchange Act,3 0 ' the Poliy of the Board of Governors Concerning Due Diiz'ence Require-
ments for Public Oferings of Securities .302 Since the filing was a statement of policy
rather than a rule, it became effective upon filing.
The Statement of Policy remained in effect for only a few months. In an
unusual turnabout, the NASD notified the Commission on February 22, 1977
that it was rescinding the statement because its Board of Governors "has recon-
296 NASD Notice to Members 75-33 (Apr. 25, 1975) at 3-4. The proposed Statement of Policy indi-
cated that "[t]he Association believes. . . that failure to fulfill the obligation of due diligence described
under the Securities Act of 1933, or in a manner inconsistent with the anti-fraud provisions, constitutes
conduct inconsistent with high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade."
Id. at 13.
297 In this regard, the Proposed Statement of Policy reported:
Areas which appear to be covered at minimum in most due diligence investigations performed
in connection with corporate offerings, however, include a review of the issuer's corporate char-
ter, by-laws and corporate minutes including executive committee minutes for at least the previ-
ous five (5) years (or for the entire life of the issuer if it has been in existence a shorter period; or
for even a longer period than five years if circumstances dictate such) and a review of the issuer's
audited and unaudited financial statements, including footnotes, for at least the same five (5)
year or shorter or longer period commencing with the most recent statement as well as an
investigation of any changes in auditors within that time period and the reasons therefor. Also,
investigations involve a sampling and examination of the issuer's chief products, major custom-
ers and suppliers and an examination of any trademarks, patents, copyrights and similar devices
where such are material and utilized to protect the issuer's business. To the extent necessary for
the underwriter to verify material information furnished by the issuer and/or to arrive at an
understanding of the issuer's business, investigations include a review of the issuer's current and
past relationships with banks, creditors, suppliers and trade associations. Most due diligence
investigations also include communication by the underwriter with key company officials and
appropriate marketing and operating personnel regarding the nature of the issuer's bus iness and
the role of each of the above individuals as well as an on site inspection, at least on a random
sampling basis, by the underwriter of the issuer's material property, plant and equipment. Prior
to completing most due diligence investigations of promotional companies, underwriters may
want to consult with experts in the scientific and technological fields if the underwriter feels it
lacks sufficient capabilities to conduct a proper investigation on its own.
Id.
298 Comment letter of SIA Compliance Division (May 23, 1975) at 2 (NASD File No. 75-33).
299 Comment letter of Association of the Bar of the City of New York (June 3, 1975) at 4 (NASD File
No. 75-33).
300 The Final Statement of Policy did not purport to address the type of procedures appropriate for (1)
competitive bidding offerings, or (2) shelf registrations and S-16 offerings in which there is no named
underwriter in the registration statement or offering circular.
301 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1976).
302 SEC File No. SR-NASD-76-9 (Form 19b-4B filed with the SEC).
[Vol. 56:755]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
sidered the issues involved and has determined that the filing of the policy state-
ment was premature and that further deliberation was required. ' 303 It appears
that the rescission was necessary because the NASD had underestimated the ex-
tent of the security industry's resistance to more explicit guidance for underwrit-
ers. Although the NASD plans to issue a Rule of Practice to describe
underwriters' obligations in connection with direct participation programs,
3 0 4
there is no indication the NASD will make any further effort to set forth general
professional standards for underwriters.
The demise of the NASD's project to adopt professional standards of reason-
able investigation for underwriters left no viable alternative to rulemaking by the
Commission. The idea of self-regulatory standard-setting was very appealing. It
would have permitted investment bankers to set realistic standards consistent
with actual underwriting practices. At the same time it offered the chance to
raise the standards of care and investigation of all underwriters to a minimum
level of adequacy. The existence of specific standards and the certification pro-
cess required by the original NASD rule proposal could have enhanced section
SlI's primary, preventive function and provided assurance to participating under-
writers that the managing underwriter or underwriters had discharged the rea-
sonable investigation responsibility.
Another appealing aspect of the standards approach is that the courts might
utilize such standards as the benchmark for adjudicating the adequacy of under-
writers' conduct in specific circumstances. However, since underwriters are not
considered "experts" as that term is used in section 11, professional standards
developed by the NASD might not be received with the deference accorded to
authoritative judgments by the accounting profession concerning professional re-
sponsibilities.
30 5
The attempt at standard-setting by the NASD points up the principal, and
perhaps insurmountable, problem with the standards approach-a lack of con-
sensus in the industry as to what those standards are and when they should ap-
ply. Those commenting upon the NASD's proposals suggested it probably is
undesirable to formulate one set of standards applicable to all situations. The
Comment letter of Smith, Barney & Co. emphasized this point:
Our experience is that each underwriting presents a comparatively unique set of cir-
303 NASD, Amendment to the Poliy of the Board of Covernors Concerning Due Diligence Requirements for Public
Ofering of Securities, SEC File No. SR-NASD-77-6 (Form 19b-4B filed with the SEC).
304 Draft of Proposed Appendix F to art. III, § 35 of the Rules of Fair Practice (Nov. 1978). A direct
participation program is defined as "a program which provides for flow-through tax consequences regard-
less of the structure of the legal entity or vehicle for distribution including, but not limited to, oil and gas
programs, . . . agricultural programs, cattle programs, [and] condominium securities. ... Id. at 4.
The proposed rules would prohibit member organizations from underwriting or participating in the public
distribution of a direct participation program unless the program met detailed standards relating to a
number of matters, including (1) additional assessments, (2) acquisitions of property from the sponsor or its
affiliates, (3) removal of the general partner or manager, (4) impermissible conflicts of interest, and (5)
disclosure of (a) organization and offering expenses, (b) sponsor's compensation, (c) quarterly reports to
participants, and other matters.
305 The possibility of judicial deference springs from the BarChris court's decision not to hold the ac-
countants in that case "to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession." 283 F. Supp. at 703.
It will be interesting to see whether the courts take judicial notice of the proposed rule and statement of
policy as evidence of what the NASD believes constitutes an adequate investigation. Although not




cumstances. . . . In our opinion the use of such a list by any underwriter would, in
time, encourage reliance upon mechanical execution of written procedures rather
than the vital analytical thinking addressed to the facts of the particular case which is
the best guaranty that all material information concerning a company will be ascer-
tained and understood.
30 6
This also seems to be the position of the court in BarChris: "It is impossible to lay
down a rigid rule suitable for every case defining the extent to which such verifi-
cation must go. It is a question of degree, a matter ofjudgment in each case."
'30 7
However, to the extent the profession cannot agree on the constituents of due
diligence, it lessens the strength of their importunities that whatever standard
does apply be lowered because of the advent of integrated disclosure.
C. Identif/ing Circumstances Afecting the Reasonableness of Underwriters' Conduct
Rather than attempting to describe how the underwriter should conduct its
investigation, several commentators have proposed that a more logical approach
would be to delineate some of the factors that should affect the nature of the
investigation while leaving to the courts the question of whether defendants lived
up to their obligations in the particular circumstances of the case. The Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure proposed that the Commission adopt a rule
identifying seven factors which a court should consider in determining care and
reasonable ground to believe with respect to information incorporated by refer-
ence into a registration statement. 30 The Advisory Committee asserted that
such a rule was needed to encourage the use of short forms of registration and to
take into account the practical problems that confront underwriters attempting
to improve disclosure in incorporated documents.30 9
The Advisory Committee's proposal was basically a reformulation of the
proposed treatment of underwriters' liability in the American Law Institute's
proposed Federal Securities Code.3 10 Section 1704 of the official draft Code is
basically comparable to section 11 of the Securities Act. 3 t1 Section 170 4 (g) pro-
vides:
In determining what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for
belief under section 1704(f)(3), the standard of reasonableness is that required of a
prudent man under the circumstances in the conduct of his own affairs. Relevant
circumstances include, with respect to a defendant other than the registrant, (1) the
type of registrant, (2) the type of defendant, (3) the office held when the defendant is
an officer, (4) the presence or absence of another relationship to the registrant when
the defendant is a director or proposed director, (5) reasonable reliance on officers,
employees, and others whose duties should have given them knowledge of the partic-
ular facts (in the light of functions and responsibilities of the particular defendant
with respect to the registrant and the filing), (6) when the defendant is an under-
writer, the type of underwriting arrangement, the role of the particular defendant as
an underwriter, and the accessibility to information with respect to the registrant,
and (7) whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by reference, the
306 Comment letter, supra note 294, at 1.
307 283 F. Supp. at 697.
308 ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 175, at 454-55.
309 Id. at 454.
310 ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (1980).
311 Section 1704 would apply not only to effective registration statements but also to portions of re-
quired annual reports on Form 10-K and any other documents incorporated by reference therein.
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particular defendant had any responsibility for the fact or document at the time of
the filing from which it was incorporated.
3 12
The drafters' comment on this section indicates that clauses (l)-(6) of the
proposed standard are "designed to permit discrimination," which, with respect
to underwriters, would include distinguishing "between ordinary and 'technical'
underwriters and between managing underwriters and members of the under-
writing group. '3 ' 3 The comment adds that "[c]lause (6) is not intended entirely
to relieve conventional underwriters other than managing underwriters of the
duty to investigate regardless of obstacles that the issuer may put in the way of
their access."' 3 14 The rationale for clause (7), concerning incorporation by refer-
ence, is stated to be:
(a) Furthering the "Form S-16" concept, which makes it impossible to ignore the
underwriter's practical problems with respect to material incorporated in an offering
statement by reference from the basic registration statement and subsequent reports,
and
(b) nondilution of the underwriter's standard of care, which is essential to the credi-
bility of the offering statement.
3 15
During the course of its extensive consideration of the draft Code, the Com-
mission proposed a number of amendments to the official draft adopted by the
American Law Institute in 1978. With respect to the reasonableness of under-
writers' conduct, the Commission concluded that the phrase "and the accessibil-
ity to information with respect to the registrant" in section 17 04 (g)(6) should be
deleted on the ground that the preceding phrase "the role of the particular de-
fendant as an underwriter" in the same clause adequately recognized the junior
role of nonmanaging underwriters without inviting undue dilution of their re-
sponsibilities. In September 1980 the Commission issued a release announcing its
determination to support enactment of the Federal Securities Code as revised to
incorporate this and the other changes which reflected agreements reached in
discussions between the Commission and Professor Louis Loss, the American
Law Institute's Reporter, and his advisors.
3 16
The approach contained in section 1704(g) of the proposed Code, with the
revision recommended by the Commission and agreed to by the Reporter, may,
for several reasons, be an appropriate approach for the Commission to take now
without awaiting enactment of the Code. First, it takes into account the circum-
stance of incorporation by reference, while at the same time not relieving under-
writers of their basic duty to investigate all information contained in the
registration statement. This approach thus retains the threat of liability for neg-
ligence which is the primary incentive for ensuring that adequate disclosure is
made to investors.
The second major attribute of this approach is that it preserves the flex-
ibility of the existing definition of reasonableness contained in section 11 (c). The
proposal merely amplifies, for the courts' assistance, the types of circumstances
312 ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1704(g) (1980).
313 Id., Comment 2 at 714.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 714-15.




bearing on the question of whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable in
light of all the surrounding circumstances. By so doing, it avoids the problems
attending any effort to describe in the abstract what constitutes reasonable con-
duct under all the possible circumstances that could exist in the varied offerings
being made today. Courts would continue to enjoy maximum latitude to adjust
statutory responsibilities to changing circumstances, such as the evolution of dif-
ferent underwriting arrangements and the increasing efficiency of the securities
markets.
Even if the Commission resolved to adopt a rule patterned after section
1704(g) of the proposed Code, it still would be necessary to address many specific
questions about the meaning and application of the rule's terms. For example,
how should the first clause-concerning the type of registrant-affect the under-
writer's responsibility to investigate? Should external indicia of financial sound-
ness-an AAA rating by Moody's, for example-mean the underwriter need do
little or no investigation into the issuer's creditworthiness? To take another ex-
ample, does clause (6) mean that a participating underwriter should be relieved
entirely from liability when it has been informed by the managing underwriter
that the managing underwriter has successfully completed its investigation, when
in fact no reasonable investigation was ever made?3 17 Answers to questions like
these would have to be explored before the Commission could be assured that
adopting such a rule would adequately serve the public interest and protect in-
vestors. It perhaps should be noted that neither competitive pressures nor the
speed with which registration statements can be prepared under an integrated
system appears to be a factor to be considered. Moreover, it is unlikely that a
court will conclude that because an issuer prepared and filed a Form 10-K, the
underwriter's sole obligation is to read it. Such a result would clearly contradict
BarChrr.
The strongest argument against this approach is actually a minor one-that
the judiciary might well take into account the circumstances identified in section
170 4 (g) even if no such provision were available to provide guidance. A second
argument is that the failure to specify in advance every other circumstance of
importance could prompt courts to disregard altogether circumstances other
than those enumerated. This result, however, seems most unlikely given the thor-
ough manner in which the courts thus far have analyzed the factual circum-
stances surrounding suits involving section 11 claims.
VIII. Conclusion
This article has discussed the role of a critical professional group in the dis-
tribution of securities-investment bankers. Their rendition of a broad range of
financing-related services makes them indispensible both to issuers and to effec-
tive capital formation.
318
Traditional notions about underwriters' ability to satisfy their "due dili-
317 See the discussion in text accompanying notes 147-152 supra.
318 William C. Freund, senior vice-president and chief economist of the New York Stock Exchange,
estimates there is a need for external equity financing of $275 billion during the 1980's. Only approxi-
mately $70 billion was raised by equity offerings in the 1970's. See Carson-Parker, The Capital Cloud Over
Smokestack 4merica, FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 1981, at 70.
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gence" defense by reasonably investigating all information contained in the regis-
tration statement may have been stretched to the limit by a number of
developments unforeseen by the drafters of the original securities acts. The gen-
eral lack of public information about the securities offerings of the 1920's,3t9 for
example, stands in sharp contrast to the wide range of accounting and other
company-specific information that is widely disseminated throughout increas-
ingly efficient securities markets. But an efficient market merely conveys infor-
mation effectively; it does not verify, correct or otherwise edit it.32° This
accentuates the continuing need for high standards of professionalism in the
preparation and distribution of information to investors.
The evolving characteristics of the securities markets and experience in ad-
ministering the federal securities laws have prompted the Commission to under-
take a comprehensive program to integrate the disclosure requirements of the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act. In the course of promulgating an inte-
grated disclosure system, the Commission will be required to resolve a number of
difficult technical and policy questions. Appropriate solutions to these problems
are being sought by taking a flexible, pragmatic approach which seeks to strike a
fair balance among competing considerations.
32 1
One such problem now under consideration concerns the extent to which an
underwriter is responsible for detecting and correcting inadequate disclosure in
portions of Exchange Act reports incorporated by reference into short-form regis-
tration statements. This article has indicated that situations may occur in which
the underwriter's opportunity to investigate and verify information might be re-
stricted for reasons which appear to be ultimately beyond its control. In such
circumstances, the need to avoid imposition of unreasonable burdens may re-
quire that the Commission and the courts be responsive to the underwriter's pre-
dicament.
Nevertheless, under an integrated disclosure system underwriters should be
expected to do all they can to assure full and fair disclosure. 32 2 In the context of
short-form registrations, underwriters should pay particular attention to the need
to update disclosures made in incorporated documents so that the registration
statement discloses all material changes in the issuer's affairs since the end of the
latest fiscal year. To fulfill this responsibility, underwriters will invariably have
to make some investigation so that they can verify the issuer's representations. It
is only the degree of investigation which will, of necessity, vary depending upon
the circumstances.
319 One source provides this summary of disclosure practices prior to the Securities Act:
A typical offering circular for that period contained little or no financial information, very little
information as to the use of proceeds, a rather brief description of the securities themselves and
few, if any, material facts relating to the business of the issuer. Furthermore the disclosures
required today with respect to such matters as underwriting spreads, compensation of manage-
ment and the possible interests of insiders in the financing or in recent transactions with the
issuer were virtually unknown.
Halleran & Calderwood, supra note 9, at 94.
320 See text accompanying notes 185-86 & 250 supra.
321 In this connection, one commentator has observed that "[t]he challenge presented to any project for
coordination is to preserve the best of what this law [the Securities Act] now provides while accomplishing
the pruning and slicing that appear desirable and possible in a coordinated law." Cohen, supra note 176,
at 1344.
322 As a general proposition, the author agrees with Professor Folk that "sanctions to compel careful
scrutiny by underwriters must be sustained intact." Folk, supra note 56, at 39.
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The Commission can assist underwriters in fulfilling these responsibilities in
several ways. First, it can adopt provisions that remove legal uncertainty about
the meaning of modifying or replacing previously disclosed information. Pro-
posed instructions to the new short registration forms, if adopted, will accomplish
this objective.
3 23
Second, the Commission may be able to limit any further dilution of the
underwriter's influence over the timing of securities offerings, which could affect
the opportunity to investigate. Since the effective date of most registration state-
ments is accelerated by the Commission, the Commission might consider, as a
matter of policy, requiring that in every underwritten offering the managing un-
derwriter must not only request acceleration of the effective date324 but also indi-
cate whether or not there has been time reasonably to review and comment upon
documents incorporated by reference. This procedure would, by making the un-
derwriter an equal participant in the decision to accelerate, provide a valid basis
for underwriters to insist upon completion of their reasonable investigation prior
to filing. When the underwriter requests acceleration it can be assumed that he is
satisfied with the adequacy of disclosures in the registration statement.
Third, the Commission could encourage issuers to use shelf registration
statements for various offerings through one or more underwriters named in the
shelf registration. To the extent a shelf registration is filed and becomes effective
before any particular offering is scheduled, the named underwriters will have
more opportunity to investigate the issuer. When underwriters are not named in
the shelf, the Commission should perhaps require a post-effective amendment
describing the offering in which they will be involved. Such amendments must
be declared effective by the staff (there is no twenty day period by which post-
effective amendments may become effective) and the staff could request that the
underwriters join in the request for the specific effective date.
Finally, the Commission should consider adopting a rule modeled after sec-
tion 1704(g) of the proposed Federal Securities Code, with the revision suggested
by the Commission. Such a rule would indicate to the courts that the Commis-
sion believes the specified circumstances should be taken into account in review-
ing the adequacy of underwriters' conduct. The appropriateness of the
circumstances set forth in revised section 1704(g) and their sufficiency as guides
to a reviewing court could be ascertained in the public comment process and staff
analysis which would precede adoption of such a rule.
As discussed above, the potential changes in the underwriter's role in an
integrated disclosure system are not compelled by any rule change. Underwriters
can still conduct their investigation prior to any filing; even after documents have
been prepared by others and filed, changes can be made by filing amendments.
To the extent integration simplifies the securities registration process, however, it
may make certain traditional underwriting practices less convenient to under-
writers. If this is so, then to a large degree the best solution may be to reassess
inventively the structure of underwriters' practical relationship with issuers.
323 These proposals are described in the text accompanying notes 264-70 supra.
324 Rule 461, 17 C.F.R. § 230.461 (1980), presently provides that: "[r]equests for acceleration of the
effective date of a registration statement shall be made in writing by the registrant, the managing under-
writers of the proposed issue, and the selling security holders, if any." However, in the past this rule has
not always been strictly construed in situations where the issuer has not yet selected the underwriters.
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This article has suggested several actions the Commission might take to help
clarify the responsibilities of underwriters participating in distributions of securi-
ties registered on short forms. But it is well to emphasize that an integrated
disclosure system will in no way affect the underwriter's role in securities offerings
of new or relatively unseasoned issuers. 325 The Commission's Special Study of
the Securities Markets concluded that the underwriter's role is "particularly im-
portant" when the offering involves new or unseasoned securities because
under the statutory scheme of free access with full disclosure, the determination of
which issues are suitable for public ownership depends primarily upon the under-
writer who originates and sells the issue. Secondly since corporations going public for
the first time are unlikely to be well known to the public and their managements are
frequently inexperienced in public finance, the issuer or selling stockholders usually
have to rely heavily upon the advice and assistance of the underwriter.
326
The Commission's desire for full investigations when unseasoned issuers make
offerings is also evidenced in its adoption in 1972 of Guide 16 of the Guides for
Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements, which authorizes the Com-
mission staff to review the adequacy of the steps taken by underwriters to verify
information in the registration statements filed by such issuers.
327
An integrated disclosure system holds the promise of providing issuers with
less burdensome and more efficient mechanisms for raising capital in the securi-
ties markets. 328 To realize these objectives, the Commission must rely on invest-
ment bankers to adapt to the new system's requirements without sacrificing their
basic responsibilities to the investing public. They will continue to be the gate-
keepers at the junction of investor confidence and capital formation.
325 Such issuers would use Form C and deliver to investors a prospectus containing all information
needed for investment decisionmaking.
326 SEC REPORT, supra note 283, at 493.
327 The Guide states:
Where a new or speculative issue of securities is being registered, the Division may request the
underwriter of the issue to explain supplementally the steps taken to verify the disclosure in the
prospectus and the Division will take into consideration such information in determining what
action is to be taken in processing the registration statement, including whether additional dis-
closure is required.
33 Fed. Reg. 18,617 (1967). As part of the integration program, the Commission is proposing to incorpo-
rate this provision into a new Rule 400B. See Securities Act Release No. 6276 (Dec. 23, 1980), 46 Fed. Reg.
78, 94 (1980).
328 For example, SIA President Edward O'Brien has indicated that the new short form registration
statements should promote capital formation. See Idaszak, Brokers Cheery, Cautious, Chicago Sun Times,
Mar. 15, 1981, at 80-81.
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